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Fire Protection Research 
for DOE Facilities: 
FY 83 Year-End Report 
Abstract 
We summarize our research in FY 83 for the DOE-sponsored project. Fire Protection 
Research for DOE Facilities. This research program was initiated in 1977 to advance fire-
protection strategies for energy technology facilities in order to keep abreast of the unique 
fire problems that develop along with energy technology research. Since 1977, the pro­
gram has broadened its original scope, as reflected in previous year-end reports. We are 
developing an analytical methodology through detailed study of fusion energy experi­
ments at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). Using these experiments as 
models for methodology development, we are currently advancing three major task areas: 
(1) the identification of fire hazards unique to fusion energy facilities, (2) the evaluation of 
accepted fire-management measures to meet and negate hazards, and (3) the performance 
of unique research into problem areas we have identified to provide input into analytical 
fire-growth and damage-assessment models. 
Introduction 
We report our work performed in FY 83 for a 
DOE-supported study entitled Fire Protection Re­
search for DOE Facilities. Previous fiscal-year re­
ports have been published.1 4 One ultimate goal 
of this study is the assessment of potential fire 
damage in such facilities. To accomplish this, 
three parameters have to be evaluated: (1) the 
fire-threat potential to the facility, (2) the response 
and effectiveness of fire-management systems, 
and (3) the possible fire-related damage. 
The milestone chart in Fig. 1 delineates the 
sub-tasks (marked by bullets) that must be com­
pleted to achieve our major goals (underlined) for 
this program. These major goals are all necessary 
to the ultimate objective: a standard guide of fire-
management tactics for large DOE facilities. It is 
appropriate here to describe the logic and signifi­
cance of each milestone as to its contribution to 
the final result. The sub-tasks listed under Fire 
Growth Parameters for Model Development are a 
combination of small- and large-scale fire experi­
ments to provide appropriate input for our model­
ing efforts and is also a partial model-validation 
tool. Those sub-tasks supporting Smoke Aerosol 
Production and Transport; Physical and Chemical 
Characteristics will help define two major phe­
nomena: (1) the potential corrosive and particulate 
damage to experimental components, and (2) the 
particulate analysis (size, distribution, etc.) that 
will provide insight into the response times of 
smoke detection systems. 
The next two milestones listed in Fig. 1 (Ad­
aptation of Modeling Technique for Fire-Risk Assess­
ment and Advanced Fire Management System Devel­
opment ) integrate all results from the previous two 
milestones and are probably the most significant 
components to the program. They combine all the 
facets of what has been learned that can be ap­
plied to actual facilities. The modeling technique 
will predict the rate and extent of fire develop­
ment in these facilities and the work on fire-
management systems will define how detection 
and suppression response to predicted fires will 
modify the degree of fire damage. The Advanced 
Fire-Management-System Development phase will 
concentrate on unique detection and suppression 
systems to deal with fire problems in DOE facili­
ties that traditional countermeasures cannot 
negate. 
In FY 83, we made significant progress in a 
number of task areas. In general, we completed 
our analysis of the 1982 fire-mode! data and we 
compared six fire models to the data from three of 
the 1982 tests. In addition, two separate publica­
tions were derived from the sen *s. Toward the 
end of FY 83, we initiated an 198 M984 series of 
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PROJECT 6294-93 FIRE PROTECTION RESEARCH 
FOR ENERGY TECHNOLOGY PROJECTS 
FY 1983 FY 1984 
MILESTONES 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.0 
n r e urowin rarciiiiuiers iur iviuum uevtsiupmeiu 
• Full-scale experiments with mixture real fuels 
• Define and apply selected model to variety of 
DOE facilities (Critical Enclosures only) 
Smoke Aerosol Production and Transport; 
Physical and Chemical Characteristics 
• Smoke balance experiments — small-scale 
• Critical effects of combustion conditions and 
heat on composition and physical structure 
of smoke aerosols 
• Time and dilution effects on physical and 
chemical smoke aerosols 
• Smoke corrosion and transport criteria 
Adapt Modeling Technique for Fire-Risk 
Assessment of Energy Technology 
Research Facilities 
• Relate fire and smoke growth rate parameters 
to response and performance of hypothetical 
fire management systems 
• Develop recommendations for optimum fire 







• State of art fire management relative to risk 
Advanced Fire Management System Development 
• Design and test prototype arrays of extinguishing 
systems for compatibility in dispensing several 
different agents or combinations of agents 
• Smart FMS design for multi applications 
First Draft of Standard Guide of Fire-Management 
/ 
Tactics for Large Energy Research Facilities 
• Develop standard guide to usable document 
(slide rule) (code) I 
Figure 1. 
facilities. 
Descriptive chart of project milestones for LLNL fire-protection research for DOE 
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widely varying fire-model tests using improved 
instrumentation and methodology. The results 
from our FY 82 test series led us to a research plan 
that we pursued for cable insulations in our Ease-
of-lgnit ion appara tus . We found, non-
conclusively, that ignition times of some cable 
types can be predicted from certain physical 
characteristics. At the same time, we performed 17 
large-scale vertical cable burns using the FY 82 re­
search protocol. The results reconfirmed our FY 82 
findings. 
In the area of chemical characteristics of 
smoke aerosol, we started and completed high-
temperature studies on the Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory (LLNL) inventory of insula-
Our FY 81 and 82 year-end reports have al­
ready described the objectives of our efforts to 
create a versatile computer model that simulates 
fires in a forced-ventilation enclosure. 1 2 Here, we 
cover the final conclusions from an analysis of the 
1982 fire-model tests, compare six fire model's 
predictions with the 1982 tests, and discuss the 
1983 fire-model tests. 
In 1982, we completed 27 fire-model valida­
tion studies and started an analysis of same. We 
finished this analysis in 1983. This involved care­
ful checking of air and fuel flows, balancing the 
gas species present, and analyzing wall thermo­
couples. We presented these findings in a paper at 
a National Bureau of Standards' meeting that 
honored Howard Emmons.' This paper is in­
cluded in its entirety as Appendix A. The most 
important conclusions were that up to 80% of the 
energy from the fires is absorbed by the enclosure 
walls, that over 2000 s are required to reach 
"chemical equilibrium" in our test cell, and that 
twice the stoichiometric amount of air is required 
for total combustion of the fuels we used. 
We chose 3 of the 1982 tests (Tests 8, 9, and 
27B) for 6 model-validation comparisons. Our re­
sults indicate that these models need significant 
improvements in order to correctly predict the pa­
rameters of a fire in our forced-ventilation enclo­
sure. The difficulty of such model improvements 
and the time required to complete them is not 
known. The comparisons and soon-to-be-
analyzed 1983-1984 results should, however, 
speed up this process. 
Even though we found all of the current ver­
sions lacking in some respects, we ranked them as 
tions by thermogravimetric analysis, differential 
scanning calorimetry, and gas chromatographic/ 
mass spectrometry. We also started and com­
pleted detailed analyses of Teflon and Kynar wire 
insulations. 
Finally, although not listed as a specific mile­
stone, we completed a reliability analysis of the 
LLNL water-supply system in the event of a ma­
jor fire. This study falls under the major heading 
of Adopt Modeling Techniques for Fire-Risk Assess­
ment of Energy Technology Research Facilities. We 
used the Digraph-Fault Tree technique, which can 
analyze a variety of complicated systems, such as 
reactor-cooling systems and nuclear-material-
safeguard systems. 
to their "friendliness" and utility to our goals. This 
is the ranking as follows: California Institute of 
Technology one-layer model (Cal Tech I), Battelle 
Pacific Northwest Laboratories' model (PNL), the 
Harvard model, the Los Alamos National Labora­
tory mode! (LANL), Cal Tech two-layer model 
(Cal Tech II), and the LLNL model. In the past 
year, we experimented with two of the models; 
both models used the Cal Tech entrainment code 
and were difficult to modify. We acquired and re­
wrote the Cal Tech I model, a relatively small 
code, so we could run and modify it ourselves as 
necessary. 
The analysis of the 1982 experimental data 
pointed out many problems in our experimental 
approach, one of which was elucidating enclo­
sure-fire characteristics more fully. Table 1 lists 
the problems of the 1982 experimental series and 
the improvements we applied to the 1983-1984 
forced-ventilation tests. The most significant 
changes were to the gas analysis and airflow sys­
tems. Leaks in the test cell and the duct were 
plugged, and the HERA filter was removed to im­
prove the airflow measurements. More gas an­
alyzers were added and a different calibration and 
sampling system was used that made the 0 2 , CO,, 
and CO measurements .ore reliable. All the im­
provements combin .« make the 1983 fire-model 
tests the best forced-ventilation data to date. 
Table 2 lists 35 experiments completed in the 
last quarter of FY 83 and the first quarter of FY 84. 
These tests investigated forced-ventilation fires 
near walls and in comers, as well as fires raised 
off the ground. We also explored the effects of the 
position of the inlet and exit ducts. Since most of 
Fire Modeling 
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Table 1. Improvemenls in instrumentation, calibration and techniques for 1983 model test series. 
1982 Problem 1983 Improvement Comments Techniques 
Instrumentation 
1. Not enough thermocou­
ples. 105 channels only 
•10 TC channels 
Uncertainty in airflow 
measurements. 
1. Uncertainty in wall 
temperatures. 





2a. Sharp edged orifice 
installed in orifice. 
2b. Amenometer 
matched to both 
sharp-edged 
orifices. 
2c. Leaks in cell and 
duct patched. 
3. Wall TCs were em­
bedded in the wall 
with sauraisen. 
Uncertainty in the 
effect of ambient 
conditions (i.e., 
heated test cell). 
2. Pool fires were not 
directly correlatibltf 
to burner fires be­
cause of pan 
diameter. 
Inability to correlate 
differeni tests and 
confirm results. 
1. Only one test was done 
per day. 
2. The ponl pan diameter 
was matched to the 
burner diameter. 
3a. Fewer changes in fuel 
and fire strength. 
3b. More overventilated 
tests. 
3c. More repeated tests. 
4. Uncertainty in gas 
measurements. 
4a. O, analyzer added 
(4 total) 
4b. CO, analyzer 
added (3 total) 
4c. CO analyzer added 
(3 total) 
4d. H,0 analyzer 
added (1 total) 
Some data were use­
less or misleading. 
4a. O. analysis moved 
from test cell floor to 
midpoint of room. 
4b. The test cell walls 
were divided into 
zones with equal 
areas that could better 
account for the geom­
etry of the test cell. 
4c. Wall TC's were 
repositioned through­
out the test cell in 
each of the new zones 
instead of on just one 
wall. 
4d. Radiometers and calo­
rimeters were 
repositioned to mea­
sure the fire not the 
layer. 
4e. Turbidity meters 
deleted. 
5. CH, burner too small 
(Dia - 30 cm) created 
momentum jet. 
Enlarged burner 
(Dia - 56 cm) 
Uncertainty in gas 
measurements. 
5. Gas samples wert 
"pumped" into the gas 
analyzers instead of 
"pulled." This allowed 
fast response times and 
didn't build up large 
pressures in the analyz­
ers to interfere with the 
calibration. 
Table 1. (Continued) 
1982 Problem 1983 Improvement 1982 Problem 1983 Improvement 
6. Exit airflow changes 6. HEPA filter was 2. Uncertainty in gas 2a. Gas calibration was 
too much during test. removed. measurements. checked daily. 
7. CHj massflow went out 7. New turbine 2b. Calibration was 
of turbine flowmeter's 
range. 
flowmeter pur­
chased and installed. 
done at sample 
probe and at ana­
lyzer not just the 
analyzer. 
Calibration 
1. Uncertainty in airflow 
measurements. 
1. All three airflow in­
struments were cali­
brated in the same 
3. Uncertainty in radia­
tion measurements. 
3a. Radiometer and 
calorimeter were 
recessed in walls. 
short duct to the 
same flow before 
any tests were run. 





these tests were completed at the end of the year, 
the results will be published in a subsequent re­
port. The 1982-1983 data represent a wide variety 
of forced-ventilation tests, wide enough, we feel, 
to validate a computer code that simulates the fire 
conditions in our forced-ventilation enclosure and 
in other DOE test cells. In 1984, we will modify 
existing computer codes with the data to better 
simulate these conditions. The code that most 
nearly duplicates the test data will be applied to 
selected enclosures to assess fire risk and define 
appropriate countermeasures. 
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Table 2. Complete i983 fire test series. 
Initial Initial Height of 
fire venti lation Position burner Inlet Outlet 
Fuel l i re strength rate in burner in room vent vent 
Test (C,H v O,) type (kW) (gm/s ) room (m> position position 
0 CM, burner 250 0 C J 0.2 Lo" Hi' 
1 CH 4 burner 490 425 C 0.2 Lo Hi 
2 CH, burner 490 225 C 0.2 Lo Hi 
3 CH, burner 490 125 C 0.2 Lo Hi 
4 CH 4 burner 490 300 C 0.2 Lo Hi 
5 CH, burner 250 125 C 0.2 Lo Hi 
b CH, burner 250 225 C 0.2 Lo Hi 
7 CH, burner 250 425 C 0.2 Lo Hi 
8 CH, burner 490 225 C 1.0 Lo Hi 
4 CH 4 burner 490 225 WW
J 0.2 Lo Hi 
10 CH, burner 250 225 WW 1.0 Lo Hi 
11 CH, burner 490 125 SEC 0.2 Lo Hi 
12 CH, burner 490 225 C 0.5 Lo Hi 
13 CH, burner 490 225 SEC 1.0 Lo Hi 
14 CH 4 burner 490 225 C 1.5 Lo Hi 
15 CH 4 burner 490 425 C 1.5 Lo Hi 
16 CH, burner 490 225 c 2.5 Lo Hi 
17 CH, burner 490 425 C 2.5 Lo Hi 
18 CH, burner 490 225 c 0.2 Hi Hi 
19 CH, burner 490 425 c 0.2 Hi Hi 
20 CH, burner 490 225 c 0.2 Hi' Hi 
21 CI I, burner 490 425 c 0.2 Hi Hi 
22 CH, burner 250 425 c 0.2 Hi Hi 
23 CH, burner 250 225 c 0.2 Hi Hi 
24 CH 4 burner 360 330 c 0.2 Hi Hi 
25 CH, burner 250 225 c 0.2 Hi Lo 
26 CH, burner 250 425 c 0.2 Hi Lo 
27 CH, burner 250 425 c 0.2 Lo Lo 
28 CH 4 burner 490 425 c 0.2 Lo Lo 
29 C,H s O pool 150 425 c 0.6 Lo Lo 
30 C ,H s O pool 150 225 c 0.6 Lo Lo 
31 C , H H O pool 150 225 c 1.5 Lo Lo 
32 CH 4 burner 250 225 c 1.5 Lo Lo 
33 CH 4 burner 250 425 c 1.5 Lo Lo 
34 C,H„0 pool 180 225 c 0.6 Lo Hi 
35 CH4 burner 150 225 c 0.5 l o Hi 
* C = center of room. 
b Lo = inlet air introduced low ~ 0.2 m. 
' Hi = inlet air introduced high — 4.2 m. 
d WW = west wall. 
'' SEC - southeast corner. 
' Hi ^ inlet air introduced high and directed down 4.0 m. 
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Large-Scale Vertical Cable Burns 
We conducted large-scale fire experiments 
to define the effect of cable size, composition, 
number and packing density on the vertical 
flame-spread rate, and, consequently, on the 
mass-burning rate. Although other parameters are 
monitored for each test, flamespread and mass-
burning rate are the most important. These data 
will be compared to results from our small-scale 
tests to assess the correspondence to real condi­
tions, and be applied to models for use in fire-risk 
assessment. Moreover, we can obtain specific fuel 
performance and enclosure-fire parameters, e.g., 
the temperature profile along the vertical surface, 
the temperature distribution throughout the test 
cell, and the enclosure-ventilation changes result­
ing from the heat-release rate. 
Figure 2 shows the support structure for the 
vertical-cable tests. The bundle of electrical con­
ductors is suspended from a steel cable threaded 
over two bicycle wheels (to decrease friction) and 
attached to a counterbalanced load cell. Adjacent 
to the ">ecimen is a vertical panel with half-meter 
in -ements for visually monitoring the flame-
spread. Calorimeters and radiometers are located 
at the ignition source, near the specimen bottom, 
and at mid-height. Similarly, chromel-alumel 
thermocouples are located at strategic points on 
the specimens, apparatus, and throughout the test 
cell. To monitor the .: elting insulation that might 
drip from a burning cable, a load cell is placed 
directly under the specimen's centerline. The 
weighing of cable melt is necessary to estimate 
mass balance and fuel-consumption rates. Ther­
mocouples attached to specimens sense tempera­
tures of the insulation to define heat transfer dur­
ing the flamespread period. 
Ignition Source 
To provide a well-defined fire producing a 
specified heat-flux level, we constructed a pre-
mixed natural gas and air burner with gravel as a 
diffusion medium. This 30-cm-o.d. circular burner 
produced a calibrated exposure flux of 5 W/cm2 at 
an energy release rate of 20 kW. A heat flux of 
5 W/cm2 or greater was identified as a threshold 
ignition energy from previous heat-release-rate 
experiments conducted at SRI, International.3 
Test Specimen 
The test specimens for this experimental se­
ries were two-layer cable bundles formed into a 
perpendicular "Z" configuration as shown in 
Fig. 3. The net vertical cable length was 1.8 m. To 
prevent undefined heat-loss effects on cable-
burning characteristics, we designed and fabri­
cated special low-mass hardware to hold the ca­
bles. We chose the vertical configuration to 
maximize the rate of flamespread and simulate a 
worst-case situation. To supplement our visual 
observations of fire growth, we attached thermo­
couples in a vertical array at approximately 0.4-m 
intervals on both faces of the specimens. 
Experimental Notes 
We performed the experiments in the LLNL 
Fire-Test Cell, an extraction-ventilation enclosure 
with a 4.7-m ceiling height and a total volume of 
100 m 3. In FY 82, we performed 6 tests, and in 
FY 83, we completed 17 additional tests. The ca­
bles chosen for the FY 83 series were based on the 
results of the FY 82 tests. Table 3 lists the cable 
types, their pertinent physical characteristics, and 
packing densities. 
To evaluate the effects of decreasing the 
overall mass and increasing the cable spacing, we 
conducted tests on three separate bundles for each 
cable type shown in Fig. 4. The first specimen was 
normally a full cable run (100% pack) that aver­
aged 20 cables in 2 layers, with a net vertical run 
of 1.8 m. The second specimen contained half this 
number (50% pack), which allowed for a 1-cable 
diameter space between each cable. The third 
specimen contained half this number, or approxi­
mately 5 cables (25% pack), in a single layer. 
The heat-release rate during these experi­
ments were calculated using both the mass-loss 
and oxygen-depletion rates; but, due to the high 
ventilation rate (500 L/s) and sparse cable burn­
ing, only the mass-loss rate provided usable data. 
Consequently, the heat-release rates for the vari­
ous experiments were derived from the mass-loss 
rate. Because many of the cable types are com­
posed of several different polymeric materials, we 
had to use an average value for heat of combus­
tion of the composite. 
Table 4 summarizes the results from the cable 
series. The data show that the FY 83 results ech­
oed the FY 82 burns. Specifically, the majority of 
cable types producer slow flamespread rates, low 
heat-release rates, and extended ignition times. 
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Figure 2. Experimental support structure for vertical cable burn (VCAB) experiments (TC = thermocouple). 
TC-B4, B5, B6 
TC-A4, A5, A6 




TC-B1, B2, B3 
n 0.61m 
f 
0.61 m —% 
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u 0.6 
TC-9, 10,11 
TC-3, 4, 5 
TC-0, 1, 2 
/-TC. 12, 13,14" 







steel wire 1 
trrrTrrnx 
Slats: are 16 guage 
cold rolled steel 
-TC 6, 7, 8 
Figure 3. Thermocouple (TC) locations for vertical cable burns. 
However, Tests 10-12, which were polyvinyl-
chloride (PVC) multiconductors, produced rela­
tively fast flamespread rates that covered the 
entire cable run. Also, these three produced con­
sistently higher peak and average heat-release 
rates. 
General Observations 
• The 50%-pack configuration produced the 
highest heat-release rate for most cable types. 
• When exposed to the 20-kW exposure fire, 
the majority of cables were very difficult to ignite. 
• Once ignited, the flamespread rate was 
very slow. 
• In most cases, the extent of flamespread 
was only a fraction of the vertical section. 
• Heat-release rates remained low and were 
slow to peak. 
• Fire performance correlates to the cable 
diameter (1.25 to 2.54 cm), the percentage of con­
ductor, and the packing density. 
• Multiconductor cables generally have less 
fire resistance. 
In the next fiscal year, only critical experi­
ments relating to flamespread, cable heat transfer, 
and cable heat-release rate are scheduled. With 
this data, we intend to define simple flamespread 
and heat-release-rate growth models as input for 
the enclosure-fire model we will select as a risk-
analysis tool. 
9 
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Figure 4. End view of test cable bundles showing 
different packing densities. 
Table 4. Results of large-scale vertical cable burns. 
Max Average Total Flamespread 
hrr1 Time hrr flamespread rate 
Test (kW) (s) (kW) (m) (m/min) 
7 65.00 400 20.00 0.3 0.05 
8 42.00 400 11.00 1.22 0.06 
9 4.0 600 2.5 1.22 0.13 
10 100.00 930 37.5 1.82 0.52 
11 300.00 660 53.2 1.82 0.44 
12 80.00 660 31.3 1.82 03 
13 2.5 Average 2.2 0.3 -
14 9.75 Average 9.75 0.3 -
15 4.0 Average 2.5 0.3 -
16 75.7 400 19.95 0.61 0.03 
17 43.75 300 12.12 0.61 0.06 
18 5.29 1000 2.72 0.00 -
19 100.00 960 37.5 0.00 -
20 9.3 1000 6.9 0.61 0.18 
21 5.3 1000 4.2 0.30 0.14 
22 16.8 1000 8.9 0.61 0.06 
23 2.9 500 1.4 0.30 0.04 
a ] Heat-release rate. 
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Ease-of-Ignition Tests 
In terms of fire performance, one very impor­
tant characteristic of cables is how they resist igni­
tion. The Ease-of-Ignition apparatus is a small-
scale experiment that ranks materials as a function 
of their ignition times. Such results can also help 
indicate relative ignition energies of materials, 
identifying sources that pose potential ignition 
threats around these materials. For fire-modeling 
purposes, ignition information adds data points 
for stochastic ignition predictions and fire growth. 
Our previous small-scale cable tests had problems 
with the wide variation of cables' physical charac­
teristics and insulation types, the combination of 
which made any realistic comparisons of perfor­
mance impossible. We developed a matrix of 
several commonly used cables to evaluate the 
individual effects of cable size, geometry, compo­
sition, and materials on ignitability. We tested the 
effect of cable size (diameter, jacket thickness, 
etc.) on ignitability by varying the outside diame­
ter of the cables while keeping the material and 
composition constant. 
Experimental Design 
Since our objective was establishing a cor­
relation between a cable's physical characteristics 
and its time to ignition, we had to identify a ma­
trix of cable types that were available in several 
different sizes. Our previous studies identified 
PVC, Neoprene, and rubber as the most com­
monly specified cable-jacketing materials on ca­
bles used at LLNL. We selected the cables listed in 
Table 5 to evaluate the effect of size and configu­
ration (i.e., multiconductor or dielectric). To en­
sure uniformity of jacket composition for each of 
the insulating materials, chemical analyses were 
performed for the different cable sizes. 
Ease-of-Ignition Test Method 
Figure 5 shows the test apparatus and related 
instrumentation. The only sensors used in this se­
ries were the thermopile and water temperature 
thermocouple (TC). Two parallel vertical speci­
mens, 140 mm wide and 152 mm high, face each 
other at a separation of 53 mm. The facing surface 
of both specimens are exposed to a methane diffu­
sion flame supplied from a multiported burner lo­
cated below the lower edge of the specimens. The 
gas flow rate through each of the independently 
controlled burners was set to approximately 
100 ml/s (12.5 SCFH) of technical-grade methane, 
producing a heat flux of 3.2 W/cm2 ± 0.2 W/cm~ 
from a total gas flow of 200 ml/s ± 10 ml/s 
(25 SCFH ± 1.3 SCFH) that resulted in an energy 
release of 7 kj/s. The reason for having two speci­
mens face each other was to simulate the re­
inforcement that would occur in a worst-case fire. 
Table 5. Specifications of cable-jacket material used at LLNL. 
Jacket/ Jacket Mass of Mass of Total cable Conductor(s) 
dielectric thickness o.d. jacket dielectric mass Number of size °. o Insulation 
Cable type materials (mm) (mm) (g/cm) (g/cm) (kg/m) conductors (mm) material 
RG 213 A'V PVC/P.E. 1 10 0.369 — 1.57 1 — 23.5 
RG 59 B/U PVC/P.E. 1.02 6 0.22 0.0925 0.56 1 — 56 
RG 58 C/U PVC/P.E. 0.14 4.95 0.14 0.05 0.38 1 0.9 52 
Telephone cable PVC/P.E. 0.3 7.62 0.561 — 4.37 4 — 56.6 
Welding cable AWG 6 Neoprene 2.54 10.24 0.68 — 1.94 1 5.3 36 
Welding AWG 4/0 Neoprene/ 
rubber 
3.5 23 4.195 — 14 1 14 29.96 
Power cord Neoprene/ 
Neoprene 
15.2 0.135 conductor 
jacket 
0.085 
0.315 4 72 
Test product Rubber/ 
rubber 
2 4.75 0.13 — 0.20 1 — 65 
Welding 2/0 Rubber/ 
rubber 
2.7 19.05 1.22 — 7.85 1 3325 strands 20.9 
Welding AWG 2 Rubber/ 
rubber 
0.3 14.2 1.07 — 4.14 1 1666 strands 25.8 
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Figure 5. Schematic of ease-of-ignition apparatus. 
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The ignition time is indicated by the time at which 
a flame attachment on a specimen surface is ob­
served and by the time when the specimens begin 
to contribute a significant quantity of fuel, as indi­
cated by a rise in voltage of a thermopile. The 
thermopile consists of a bank of thermocouples 
located 6.4 mm above the top edge of each speci­
men and 6.4 mm out from the plane of their 
surfaces." 
Test Specimens 
We tested eight rectangular cable array sam­
ples, 140 mm wide and 152 mm high. Two arrays 
were required for each test, and four replicate tests 
were conducted. The specimen holders gripped 
the cable samples at their ends and provided suf­
ficient tension to prevent large deformation of the 
individual cables due to heating, which ensured 
reasonable reproducibility among samples. 
We intended to establish a correlation be­
tween a cable's physical characteristics and its 
time to fuel contribution. In our analysis, the 
physical characteristics considered were the out­
side diameter, the total mass per centimeter, and 
the percentage of insulating material. These prop­
erties were then plotted against their respective 
times to fuel contribution. Further analysis was 
conducted to determine the change in perfor­
mance from a single conductor to a multi-
conductor. PVC, Neoprene, and rubber were ana­
lyzed separately, and all conclusions were based 
on a comparison of the performance of the three 
materials. 
PVC Results 
As shown in Fig. 6, the PVC cables tested, 
with the exception of the multiconductor, were 
PVC jacket 




















Figure 6. Cross sections of (a) single conductor cables and (b) multiconductor cables. 
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coaxial types using polyethylene as the dielectric 
material. Of the three insulating materials tested, 
PVC was the only one to exhibit a near linear rela­
tionship betwetn its physical characteristics and 
time to ignition. 
The data displayed in Figs. 7a through 7c in­
dicate the following relationships: 
• Decreasing the outside diameter reduces 
the ignition time (Fig. 7a). 
• Although it is not a linear relationship, it 
appears that decreasing the mass also reduces the 












































Figure 7. Times to fuel contribution for PVC 
as a function of (a) decrease in outside diame­
ter, (b) decrease in mass, and (c) percentage of 
insulating material and the time to ignition. 
• No correlation exist J between the percent­
age of insulating material and the ignition time 
(Fig. 7c). 
These preliminary findings follow heat-
transfer principles. In order for cable insulations 
to ignite, tney must be heated to their ignition 
temperature. The greater the mass, the more en­
ergy, or, in this case, the more time is needed to 
bring the jacket material to its critical temperature. 
Conversely, reducing the mass reduces the 
heating time. The testing of a multiconductor 
seemed to confirm the physical characteristics-
ignition time relationship. The four-conductor 
telephone cable was loosely wrapped with a PVC 
jacket that resulted in a substantial airspace be­
tween the outer jacket and the conductors. This 
elliptical cable had a major axis diameter of 
0.76cm and an ignition time of l i s . By comoari-
son, the RG 59 B/U cable (single conductor) with 
an outside diameter of 0.6 cm had an ignition time 
of 79 s. The greatly reduced ignition time for the 
multiconductor cable can be directly attributed to 
the airspace that allows the outer jacket material 
to heat up rapidly (i.e., only the mass of the jacket 
absorbs the heat as opposed to having the jacket 
and insulator in the coaxial heat up). It appears 
that we may be able to roughly predict the igni­
tion times of PVC-jacketed coaxial cables with re­
spect to the scale of the Ease-of-Ignition apparatus. 
Neoprene Results 
Due to limited availability, only three of the 
chosen four Neoprene-insulated cables were 
tested, and one of these was a multiconductor. So, 
since multiconductors are not plotted, we had to 
use only two data points. We can draw no clear 
conclusion. However, the two data points shown 
in Figs. 8a and 8b infer Neoprene's time-to-fuel-
contribution is independent of the cables' physical 
properties. Both plots show that cables with vastly 
different outside diameters and masses had al­
most identical ignition times. Yet, like PVC, the 
Neoprene multiconductor of larger diameter dis­
played a fuel-contribution time of nearly half (ig­
nited twice as fast) that of the single conductor, 47 
and Ŝ  s, respectively. This indicates that, in our 
choice of single-conductor cable sizes, we have 
exceeded a size threshold where the conductor 
absorbs most of the thermal energy. This makes 
the ignition time solely dependent on the chemi­
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Figure 8. Times to fuel contribution to Neo-





Figure 9. Rubber test result showing (a) in­
creasing outside diameter and (b) decreasing 
cable mass. 
Again, the energy dissipation in the multicon-
ductor is not as pronounced as in the single con­
ductor. Further experiments will have to substan­
tiate this hypothesis. 
Rubber Results 
Preliminary examination of the rubber-
insulated cables shows no correlation between 
physical characteristics and the time-to-fuel-
contribution (see Figs. 9a and 9b). The results 
show that the AWG 2 cable with an outside diam­
eter of 1.37 cm had an average time to ignition of 
146 s, while the larger AWG 2/0 cable with an 
outside diameter of 1.9 cm had an average ignition 
time of 120 s. Our third data point was a 0.495-cm 
wire with a short time-to-fuel-contribution of 67 s. 
And, like the previous cables, the rubber 
multiconductor indicated a reduced ignition time 
of 69 s. 
Conclusions 
The results from this test series show that the 
Ease-of-Ignition apparatus in its present form can­
not be used to accurately discriminate between 
materials with similar flammability characteristics. 
A major problem is that fire exposure fluctuates 
over a statistically significant range because it is a 
diffusion flame. Since times-to-fuel-contribution, 
in most cases, differ by only seconds, nonuniform 
exposure produces scattered results. Furthermore, 
the ignition time is calculated on the average of 
four tests. If one or more results are at extreme 
range, the average ignition time can be very inac­
curate. Although great pains were taken to ensure 
uniformity among specimens before and during 
testing, it is highly probable that individual cables 
deformed during the fire. This would change the 
amount of cable surface area exposed to the 
flame, which would alter its ignition time. 
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We believe the combination of the above 
variables is significant enough to cause the ran­
dom results obtained from the rubber-jacketed ca­
ble tests; the larger and more massive AWG 2/0 
cable had a time-to-fuel-contribution which was 
26 s less than the smaller AWG 2 cable. The fol­
lowing ignition times for the two cable types illus­
trates the wide variation in times: 
Burn AWG 2 AWG 2/0 
1 135.0 s 95 s 
2 119 0 s 145 s 
3 172.0 s 105 s 
4 159.4 s 135 s 
It can be seen that both sets of data have a 
spread of about 50 s from the shortest to longest 
ignition time. A possible improvement is to sub­
stitute a radiant panel (the same size as a speci­
men) for one of the specimens and eliminate all 
the existing burner ports except for one under the 
sample to serve as a pilot flame. The radiant panel 
would provide a uniform and steady thermal flux 
In moderate-temperature pyrolysis of various 
wire and cable insulations, the insulations form 
detectable amounts of light hydrocarbons in the 
very early degradation '-tage. 1 Our GC/MS 
analyses of the liquid pyrolyzates from these insu­
lations show no unique components of specific in­
sulations that can help in choosing fire-resistant 
cables. The data, however, can be used to isolate 
those insulations that incorporate flammable plas-
ticizers; such plasticizers enhance the insulations' 
flammability so that flame retardants should be 
incorporated if the plasticizers are used in the 
insulations. 
We have found that the production of acidic 
components is enhanced by higher heating rates, 
but, higher heating rates do not increase total acid 
production. The presence of acid acceptors (e.g., 
ZnO, HgO, Sb 2 O v and CaCO^) will influence how 
much acid is released into the environment. This 
year, we extended these kinds of detailed studies 
to Teflon and Kynar wire insulations. And, we 
added more GC/MS measurements on insulations 
reported in last year's report, specifically high-
temperature pyrolysis and usage of additional GC 
capillary columns to resolve pyrolyzates obtained 
at medium-temperature pyrolysis. 
on the specimen and should provide more re­
producible results. 
Consequently, our study can only provide 
performance trends. The study does indicate that 
the three major physical characteristics that gov­
ern a cable's ignition time are the mass per unit 
length, the outside diameter, and the ratio be­
tween conductor and insulator. It appears that ca­
bles with a conductor diameter of approximately 
0.8 cm and greater, and a ratio of conductor to out­
side diameter of 60% or more, will have ignition 
times dependent primarily on the chemical com­
position of the jacket material. Thus, if the con­
ductor's mass dominates the cable composition, it 
is as if the jacket material is attached to an infi­
nitely conductive slab. Cables containing smaller 
conductor sizes will probably perform according 
to relationships derived from a cable's chemical 
composition, physical make-up, and physical di­
mensions, as was indicated by the PVC coaxials 
we tested in this study. Similarly, PVC four-wire 
multiconductors would perform to one relation­
ship, triaxials to another, and so on. 
Experimental Procedure 
Experiments involving Teflon and Kynar wire 
insulations and their corresponding virgin polv-
mers consisted of thermogravimetric analysis 
(TGA), differential scanning analysis (DSCA), and 
GC/MS of their pyrolyzates on four chromato­
graphic columns. Teflon and wire-insulation TGA 
was done in air at heating rates of 10, 20, 40, 80, 
and 160°C/min from ambient temperature to 
900°C. As reported previously, we monitored the 
samples' weights and the generation of acidic 
components as a function of temperature. As be­
fore, the acidic components and other thermal 
degradation products were directed to a container 
filled with 200 ml of distilled water buffered to a 
pH of 6.8-9.8. The gaseous solution was gently 
stirred with a magnetic stirrer to achieve uniform 
mixing and the change in pH was measured with 
a pencil-sized pH reference electrode and re­
corded on a multichannel recorder. 
DSCA was performed on a DuPont-900 dif­
ferential scanning calorimeter using a standard 
cell. Our samples weighed between 5 and 10 mg 
and all were heated in air at 20°C/min. The rest of 
the testing followed the procedure reported in last 
year's report.1 




Polytetrafluoroethylene (Teflon), used in small-
signal wire insulations, is one of the most stable 
addition polymers, owing to the strength of the 
C-F bond and the shielding effect of the highly 
electronegative fluorine atoms. Reaction involves 
random-chain scission followed by depolymeriza-
tion and chain termination by disproportion-
ation, 7 1" although it has been suggested that, in­
stead of an unzipping mechanism, CF2 fragments 
are eliminated which subsequently combine in the 
gas phase to give tetrafluoroethylene. 
Figure 10 shows our TGA results of Teflon-7, 
Teflon-107, and virgin polytetrafluoroethylene. 
Essentially, there is one degradation phase that 
leaves no residue at the end of pyrolysis. Of the 
three samples studied, virgin polytetrafluoro­
ethylene degrades at the lowest rate and requires 
the lowest temperature for the onset of the main 
degradation phase. The main pyrolysis phase 
starts at 500°C for virgin polytetrafluoroethylene, 
at 535 °C for Teflon-7, and at 540°C for Teflon-
107. The main degradation phase is preceded by 
an induction phase that starts at 445°C for virgin 
polytetrafluoroethylene, at 4J0°C for Teflon-7, 
and at 450°C for Teflon-107. 
The effect of heating rates on the degradation 
of the two Teflon insulation^ and virgin polyterra-
fluoroethylene is summarized in Table 6. As ex­
pected, higher heating rates increase the degrada­
tion rates of all three samples. The higher, hearing 
rates, however, do not change the temperature 
that is responsible for the onset of the main deg­
radation phase of the virgin poly'etrafluoroethyl-
ene and the effect is inconsistent on the main 
pyrolysis phase of both Teflon-7 and Teflon-107. 
We also found that heating rates of 40 cC/min and 
higher decrease the temperature leading to the in­
duction phase of Teflon-107. However, the induc­

















Figure 10. Thermograms of Teflon insulations heated in air at 20°C/min. The diagonal temperature 
ramp provides a way to correlate weight loss and temperature, where the rampline defines the apex 
of a right angle between discrete points on the residual weight curve and temperature scale. 
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Table 6. The effect of heating rate on thermal degradation of Teflon. 
Heating Onset of Onset of Degradation Residual wt. 
rate induction phase main phase rate at end of 
Sample (°C/min) (°C) <°C) (%/min) pyrolysis (%) 
Virgin 10 430 500 22 0 
polytetrafluoroethylene 20 445 500 33 0 
40 445 500 55 0 
80 445 500 90 0 
160 450 500 >100 0 
Teflon-7 10 430 495 25 0 
20 430 535 50 0 
40 430 500 73 0 
so 485 548 >100 0 
160 230 550 >100 0 
Teflon-107 10 450 545 29 0 
20 450 540 43 0 
40 425 545 82 0 
80 370 540 >100 0 
160 200 490 >100 0 
is exposed to a heating rate of 160°C/min. Higher 
heating rates do not lower the temperature re­
sponsible for the induction phase of virgin poly-
tetra fluoroethy lene. 
Figure 11 shows the DSC A of virgin poly­
tetrafluoroethylene in air; the endotherm began at 
338°C, which we attribute to melting and an 
exotherm began at 445°C which is at the start of 
the induction period or very slow decomposition 
phase. Teflon-7 showed an endotherm starting at 
317°C and an exotherm starting 460°C, which is 
the beginning of the induction period. Teflon-107 
showed an endotherm at 322°C and a beginning 
of an exotherm at 460°C, again due to initiation of 
the decomposition phase. 
The gaseous-products analysis shows the 
presence of HF which we think is formed as a 
result of the following reaction: 
2COF2 + 2H 2 0 * CO, + 4HF. 
Other gaseous secondary products formed after 
dehalogenation were found to be low-molecular-
weight hydrocarbons such as methane, ethylene, 
acetylene, ethane, propane, propyne, isobutane, 
n-butane, 1-butene, isobutylene, cis-2-butene, 
trans-2-butene, and pentane. These hydrocarbons 
are produced in large quantities from virgin 
polytetraflaoroethylene, but not from Teflon-107 
and Teflon-7: Of the latter two insulations, 
Exo 
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Figure 11. DSCA of Teflon insulations heated 
in air at 20°C/min. 
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Teflon-107 produces more hydrocarbons than 
Teflon-7. We also noticed that high-temperature 
pyrolysis increased the amount of the hydrocar­
bons in all samples. In addition, the gaseous mix­
ture in all samples contained C,FH/ C^F,,, C4FK, 
C2F 4, C 2F 6, and CF.,. 
High-temperature pyrolysis of Teflon-107 led 
to a liquid pyrolyzate comprised mainly of trimers 
and tetramers of tetrafluoroethylene, hexafluoro-
benzene, l,3-di-(2-xenyl)-benzene. Teflon-7's 
high-temperature pyrolysis resulted in liquid 
pyrolvzates consisting of 3,5,5-trimethyl-l-
hexene, diethylphthalate, butyl methyl phthalate, 
dioctylphthalate, methyl-2-methyl octadecanoate, 
3,6-dimethyl-3-heptanol, trimers and tetramers of 
tetrafluoroethylene. 
The liquid pyro lyza te obtained from 
medium-temperature pyrolysij of tetrafluoro­
ethylene yielded 2-H-perfluorohexane, 3,5,5-
trimethyl-1-hexene, tetrafluoroethylene trimer 
and tetrafluoroethylene tetramer, and unidenti­
fied components. Medium-temperature pyrolysis 
of Teflon-107 rendered a pyrolyzate comprised 
of 2-methyl-l-(2-methylpropylimino) propane, 
perfluoroheptene-1, perfluoromethyl-cyclohexane, 
tetrafluoromethyicyclohexane, perfluoroheptene-1, 
butylphthalate, and dioctylphthalate. The phthal-
ates are decomposition products of the plasticizer 
used in formulation. Medium-temperature pyroly­
sis of Toflon-7 produced a liquid pyrolyzate con­
sisting of 2-N-hexyl-N-methyl pyrrolidene, 
hutylphthalate, and dioctylphthalate. 
Kynar 
Kynar (polyvinylidene fluoride) a'so used in 
small-signal wire, thermally degrades primarily 
by dehydrofluorination with evidence of other 
degradative processes such as chain scission, 
cross-linking, cyclization and hydroperoxide for­
mation."' The TGA of Kynar-51 and virgin polyvi­
nylidene fluoride show that both have two re­
gions of decomposition. There is the main 
pyrolysis region, which is due to loss of HF, and a 
second region which involves decomposition of 
the residual cross-linked polymer chains. The 
main degradation region is preceded by an induc­
tion period that is probably due to activation of 
the weak links in the polymer. 
Figure 12 contrasts the thermograms of 




Figure 12. Thermogram of Kynar-51 and virgin Kynar heated in air at 20°C/min. See Figure 10 
caption for the interpretation of the temperature rampline. 
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heated in air at 20°C/min. We see that the main 
degradation phase for Kynar-51 shows a lower 
overall weight loss and a lower rate of weight loss 
than virgin polyvinylidene fluoride. 
The effect of heating rates on the degradation 
of Kynar-51 and virgin polyvinylidene fluoride is 
summarized in Table 7. As expected, the higher 
heating rates lead to higher degradation rates and 
therefore faster production of HE We found that 
heating rates below 160°C/min do not effect the 
temperature responsible for the onset of the in­
duction phase of virgin polyvinylidene fluoride. 
At 160°C/min, the temperature leading to the in­
duction phase of virgin polyvinylidene fluoride is 
considerably lower than that observed with the 
lower heating rates. The induction phase of 
Kynar-51 occurs at a higher temperature at higher 
heating rates up to a heating rate of 160°C/min, at 
which rate the induction phase occurs at a consid­
erably lower temperature. The effect of heating 
rates is inconsistent on the main phase pyrolysis 
of both the Kynar-51 and the virgin polyvinyli­
dene fluoride samples. 
Figure 13 shows the DSCA results of polyvi­
nylidene fluoride and Kynar-51. Virgin polyvinyli­
dene fluoride shows an endotherm at 150°C due 
to the polymer melting, an endotherm at 375°C in 
the realm of the induction phase, an exotherm at 
442°C in the beginning of the dehalogenation re­
gion, and an exotherm at 455QC where the deg­
radation of the residual cross-linked polyol be­
gins. Kynar-51 shows an endotherm at 149°C due 
to melting, an exotherm at 390°C due to the be­
ginning of dehalogenation region, and an 
exotherm at 445°C at the beginning of the deg­
radation of the residual polymer. 
HF is the dominant gas evolved from degrad­
ing virgin polyvinylidene fluoride and Kynar-51 at 
both medium and high temperatures. Other gases 
formed from virgin polyvinylidene fluoride and 
Kynar-51 at both the medium- and high-tempera­
ture pyrolysis are methane, ethylene, acetylene, 
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Figure 13. DSCAs of Kynar insulations heated 
in air at 20°C/min. 
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80 330 380 >100 460 0 
160 150 400 >100 500 0 
Kynar 10 90 422 35 473 0 
20 165 420 39 500 0 
40 245 420 >100 500 1.0 
80 300 430 >100 525 1.75 
160 170 410 >100 530 1.75 
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n-butane, 1-butene, isobutylene, trans-2-butene, 
ethylacetylene, 1.3-butadiene, and pentane. 
The liquid pyrolyzate from virgin polyvinyli-
dene fluoride heated at medium temperature 
yielded a highly complex mixture, consisting of at 
least 50 compounds, of which only 5 components 
were identified. W? identified l-H-perfluorohex-
ane, ethylacetate, 1,1,1,3,3-pentafluoropropene, 
2-methoxy diphenyl ether, and 1,1,1-trifluoro-
ethane. High-ten.perature pyrolysis also yielded a 
complex mixture, most of which was not identi­
fied, K t which matched those found in the 
medium-temperature pyrolyzate. 
The liquid pyrolyzate from Kynar-51, gener­
ated at medium temperature, rendered the follow­
ing compounds: 1-H-perfluorohexane, borneol, 
di(trifluoromethyl) furan, methylphenylacetate, 
farnesol, n-butyl-o-phthalate, 4-carboxybenzo-
phenone, and other unidentified components. 
High-temperature pyrolysis yielded 3-bromo-3,3-
difluoro-1-propene, tetrafluoro-2-methylpentane, 
4-methoxy-diphenyl ether, 2(trifluoromethyl) pro-
pene, 1,1,2,2-tetrafluoropropane, hexafluoro-
tert-butyl tr if luoroacetate, 1,1,2,2,3,3,4,4-
octafluoiopentane, and a number of unknown 
compounds. 
Additional GC/MS Results on FY 82 
Pyrolyzates 
PVC 
Table 8 lists additional degradation products 
identified this year for the FY 82 materials tested 
previously. The products were generated at me­
dium temperature or at the temperature responsi­
ble for the dehalogenation region, and were sepa­
rated on an SE-54 fused-silica capillary column. 
High-temperature pyrolysis of virgin PVC, 
PVC-3, PVC-78, and PVC-104 produced high con­
centrations of ethylene, acetylene, ethane, pro­
p a n e , p ropylene , p ropyne , n - b u t a n e , 
1-butene, isobutylene, and ethylacetylene. The 
amount of the gaseous hydrocarbons in all of the 
PVC samples was considerably higher at this tem­
perature than those formed at medium temperature. 
Table 9 lists the constituents of the liquid 
pyrolyzates generated at high temperature sepa­
rated on both the Carbowax-20M and the SE-54 
columns. Both columns indicated that the liquid 
pyrolyzate consists primarily of aromatic compo­
nents which are largely the secondary decomposi­
tion products of PVC. In addition to the aromatic 
compounds formed directly from the decompos­
ing plastics, degradation products are also formed 
from the plasticizers such as phthalic anhydride, 
di-(2-ethylhexyl) phthalate, phthalic acid, dibutyl 
phthalaie, and stearic acid. 
Rubber 
High-temperature pyrolysis of Neoprene-CU7, 
-84, and -435 resulted in a substantial increase in 
the production of the the:^ hydrocarbons: ethyl­
ene, acetylene, ethane, propane, propylene, 
propyne, n-butane, 1-butene, isobutylene, ris-2-
butene, trans-2-butene, ethylacetylene, pentane, 
and a number of other unidentified hydrocarbons. 
GC/MS results of the liquid pyrolyzates gen­
erated from Neoprene are listed in Table 10. The 
constituents are mainly chlorinated and non-
chlorinated aromatics, originating from the de­
grading plastics, as well as phthalates which are 
degradation products of the plasticizers used in 
the formulations. The main difference between 
th^se high-temperature degradation products and 
those from medium-temperature pyrolysis is a re­
duction in the quantity of liquid pyrolyzates, par­
ticularly in the lower-rr.olecular-weight compounds. 
The SE-54 results at medium temperature for 
rubber-134 and -138 show mainly higher molecu­
lar weight aliphatic hydrocarbons, aliphatic alco­
hols, naphthalene, benzoic, and phthalic acids for 
rubber-134; those from rubber-138 are predomi­
nantly aromatic. 
High-temperature pyrolysis of rubber-12, 
rubber-134, rubber-138, rubber-1132, and rubber-
1138 again produced large amounts of the C,-C=; 
hydrocarbons: methane, ethylene, acetylene, pro­
pane, propylene, propyne, isobutane, n-butane, 
1-butene, isobutylcne, trans-2-butene, 1,3-butadi-
ene, and pentane. 
The constituents of the liquid pyrolyzates 
from the rubbers are aromatic esters, aldehydes, 
ketones, and variously substituted benzenes 
(Table 11). In addition, degradation products from 
the plasticizers include such as palmitic acid, 
dioctylphthalate, n-amylphthalate, phthalic anhy­
dride, butylmethylphthalate, and n-butyl-o-
phthalate. The overall effect of the high-tempera­
ture pyrolysis on the liquid degradations products 
is that the pyrolyzate formed at high temperature 
is composed mainly of aromatic componen.s as 
opposed to the low-temperature pyrolyzate which 
is comprised of both aliphatic and aromatic 
constituents. 
Polyethylene 
High-temperature pyrolysis of polyethylene 
yielded a considerable increase from medium-
temperature pyrolysis in the production of ethyl­
ene, acetylene, ethane, propane, propylene and 
Table 8. Newly identified degradiation products from pyrolysis of PVC a 
generated at medium temperature and separated on SE-54 fused-sileca capil­
lary column. 
TR' TR 
(min) Virgin PVC (mint PVC-3 
3.0 m-xylene 3.9 pinocamphene 
3.7 n-propylbenzene 4.0 ethyltoloene 








(min) PVC-78 (min) PVC-104 
3.6 phenylacetaldehyde 3.6 phenylacetaldehyde 
3.9 ethyltoluene 3.9 ethyltoluene 
4.6 propenylbenzenc 4.6 propenylbenzene 
5.1 l-phenyl-l-nitroelhane 5.1 l-phenyl-l-nitroelhane 
5.4 m- and p-cthylstyrene 5.4 m- and p-ethylstyrene 
6.1 1-methylindane 6.1 methylaliylbenzene 
6.5 methyl-1-indene 6 3 1-methylindane 
6.9 naphthalene 6.5 methyl-1-indene 






* Retention times (inTables 8-14). 
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Table 9. Pyrolysis products of PVC materials generated at high temperature, separated on the 
Carbowax-20M and SE-54 columns. 
T„ TK 
Insulation (tnin) Carbowax-20M (min) SE-54 
Virgin PVC 3.7 l-methyI-2-ethylbenzene 3.2 6,6-dimethylfulvene 
4.8 m-methylstyrene 3.7 phenylacetaldehyde 
6.5 styrenc 4.0 methyltoluene 
7.4 3-methylindene 4.5 2,2,4-trimethylheptane 
8.8 naphthalene 4.8 o-meUiylstyrene 
10.0 1-methylnaphthalene 5.4 2,5-dimethylheptane 
11.1 biphenyl 5.5 2-methyIindane 
11.5 1 j-dimethy lnaphthalenc 6.4 methylallylbenzene 
11.9 2-ethylnaphthalene 6.6 1,2-dihydronaphthalene 
14.0 allylnaphthalene 7.1 azulene 
14.5 fluorene 8.2 3-methyl-l,2-dihydronaphthalene 
17.6 phenanthrene 8.6 2-methylnaphthalene 
19.1 4-methyl phenanthrene 8.? 1-methylnaphthalene 
22.8 1,2,3,4-tetrahydrofluoranthene 9.9 acenaphthene 
24.1 dioctylphthalate 14.8 phenanthrene 
24.7 Huoranthene 16.2 2-methyl anthracene 
26.4 5,6-benzo-7-phenylbicyclo (2,2,1) hept-2-ene 
PVC-3 3.6 xylene 4.1 ethyltoluene 
4.4 p-ethyltoluene 4.9 propenylbenzene 
5.1 isopropyi benzyl heptane 6.4 allyltoluene 
9.6 naphthalene 7.1 naphthalene 
1L.8 1-methylnaphthalene 8.9 methylnaphthalene 
11.9 1-ethylnaphthalene 9.6 phthalic acid 
12.1 phenol 16.5 butyl phthalate 
12.2 biphenyl 
15.3 phthalic anhydride 
15.5 2-hydroxy-4-methoxy-6-methyIbenzaldehyde 
15.9 ethylene glycol dibenzoate 
18.7 dibutyl phthalate 
20.4 4-methylphenanthrene 
PVC-78 7.9 l-phenyl-l,2-propandione 4.5 isooctyl alcohol 
8.8 naphthalene 7.1 azulene 
10.4 1-methylnaphthalene 8.7 benzoic acid 
11.4 biphenyl 9.0 1-methylnaphthalene 
11.9 1,2-dimethylnaphthalene 10.0 phthalic anhydride 
14.4 phthalic acid 17.4 di-(2-ethylhexyl) phthalate 
PVC-104 3.5 o-xylene 3.1 6,6-dimethyl fulvene 
3.9 isopropylbenzene 3.7 phenylacetaldehyde 
4.1 styrene 3.9 benzyl ester 
9.5 naphthalene 4.1 isopropylbenzene 
10.9 1-methylnaphthalene 4.9 methylstyrene 
12.1 phenol 5.6 o-allyltoluene 
18.6 anthracene or phenanthrene 11.4 2,6-di-tert-butyl-4-methyl phenol 
16.7 stearic acid 
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Table 10. Pyrolysis products of Neoprene generated at high temperature and separated on the 
Carbowax-20M and SE-S4 columns. 
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8.3 1-inei hv 1-1 H-indene 
9.7 naphthalene 
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9.9 chloroprene dimer 
10.5 naphthalene 
12.1 2-methylnaphthalene 
21.1 phenyl B-naphthylamine 
3.1 n-butyl chloroacetate 
3.3 2-nonynic acid 
3.7 benzyl chloride 
3.8 n-propylbenzene 















15.8 phthalic anhydride 
29.8 dioctylphthalate 
Neoprene-435 3.9 x-xylene 
4.4 l-methyl-3-ethylbenzene 
















3.1 6,6-dimethyl fulvene 
3.8 benzyl chloride 
3.9 n-propyl benzene 






Table 11. Pyrolysis products of rubber generated at high temperature and separated on the 
Carbowax-20M and SE-54 columns. 
TR TR 
Insulation (min) Carbowax-20M (mint SE-54 




















Rubber-134 3.3 ethylbenzene 3.1 l,2-dimethyl-3-ethyIbenzene 
4.3 styrene 4.1 1-phenyl-l-nitroethane 
8.2 methyl-1-indene 5.4 1-chloroheptadecane 











27.7 butylmethyl phthalate 
Rubber-138 3.3 1,2-dimethylbenzene 3.2 cyclotetracene 
4.3 benzocyclobutane 3.5 isopropylbenzene 
4.6 allylbenzene-1-phenyl-l-nitroethane 3.8 phenylacetaldehyde 
5.7 phenylcyclopropane 3.9 l-methyl-2-ethylbenzene 
7.1 benzaldehyde 4.2 isopropylbenzene 
8.1 1-methyl-lH-indene 4.4 methylstyrene 
8.5 acetophenone 4.9 propenylbenzene 
9.2 azulene 5.1 chlorindene 
9.6 naphthalene 6.6 l,7-ethene-spiro-(2,6)mono-
10.0 0-phenylethyl acetate 4,8-diene-2,8-Iactone 
11.3 methylnaphthalene 7.1 naphthalene 
11.8 benzothaozole 9.1 /3-phenylethyl acetate 
12.0 phenol 9.9 acenaphthene 
12.3 biphenyl 13.2 1,3-diphenylpropane 










Rubber-1132 4.8 styrene 3.2 6,6-dimethylfulvene 
9.0 l-phenyl-l,2-propandione 3.9 ethyltoluene 
10.0 naphthalene 4.9 allylbenzene 
11.3 methylnaphthalene 7.1 azulene 
12.3 phenol 9.8 phthalic anhydride 
15.5 Phthalic anhydride 17.7 d-n-amyl phthalate 
16.0 benzoic acid 20.8 amyl phthalate 





25.4 isopropyl phthalate 
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propyne. Liquid pyrolyzates generated at high 
temperature consist mainly of aromatic com­
pounds and high-molecular-weight aliphatic hy­
drocarbons (Table 12). 
Polyurethane 
High-temperature pyrolysis did not produce 
any detectable effect on the generation of C,-C 4 
hydrocarbons (Table 13). The mixture consisted of 
various aromatic compounds. The main difference 
be tween med ium- tempera tu re and high-
temperature pyrolysis is that the pyrolyzate gen­
erated at high temperature consists of a wider 
variety of products. Some of these products are 
halogenated, which are probably degradation 
products of a flame retardant used in this 
formulation. 
Nylon 
Both the medium- and high-temperature 
pyrolysis of nylon rendered the following hydro­
carbons: methane, ethylene, acetylene, ethane, 
p r o p a n e , propylene , p r o p y n e , i sobutane , 
n-butane, 1-butene, isobutylene, cis-2-butene, 
trans-2-butene, ethylacetylene, 1,3-butadiene, and 
pentane. High-temperature pyrolysis affects the 
production of the minor constituents of the liquid 
pyrolyzate rather than changes the general mech­
anism of degradation. High temperature gener­
ated larger amounts of n-butane, 1-butene, and 
isobutylene than medium temperature. The liquid 
pyrolyzate generated at high temperature, as op­
posed to that from medium temperature, again 











amounts of minor constituents comprised of creo-
sol, 2,5-dimethylbenzene, 2,-5-dimethylbenzoate, 
methyl-3-butanoate and tetrahydro-quinoline. 
Mylar 
Table 14 compares high-temperature pyroly­
sis of polyethylene terephthalate with Mylar. Sim­
ilar amounts of Cj-C 3 products are produced at 
both medium and high temperatures, however, 
polyethylene terephthalate forms large amounts 
of C4-hydrocarbons at both medium and high 
temperatures, such as n-butane, 1-butene, iso­
butylene, cis-2-butene, and trans-2-butene. 
Conclusions 
High-temperature pyrolysis leads to forma­
tion of large amounts of light hydrocarbons as 
well as to production of substantial amounts of 
aromatic species. Our results from FY 83 con­
firmed earlier findings in that all the insulations 
we investigated form detectable amounts of light 
hydrocarbons upon smoldering or flaming com­
bustion. These are detected in the very early deg­
radation stages of the samples pyrolyzed either 
under controlled laboratory conditions or ignited 
in the large-scale test cell. Such information is 
useful for selecting or designing appropriate early 
warning alarm systems for buildings housing 
costly equipment. Also, the extensive GC/MS 
analysis of the liquid pyrolyzates confirmed that 
this information can aid in isolating insulations 
which incorporate flammable plasticizers. 
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Table 12. Pyrolysis products of polyethylene generated at 
high temperature and separated on the Carbowax-20M 
column. 
TR 
Insulation (min) Carbowax-20M 













Polyethylene-77 3.7 styrene 
6.1 1-meihylphenylacetylene 
8.9 naphthalene 
10.2 hexahydroiarneool and methylnaphthalene 
10.5 3-methylpentine 
Polyethylene-95 3.1 undccanol-1 
4.1 oct-1-ene 




Table 13. Degradation products from pyrolysis of Polyurethane-89 separated on the Carbowax-
20M and SE-54 columns. 
T R 






5.6 di-(4-chlorobutyl) ether 
5.9 indene 




11.0 bis (4-chIorobutyI) ether 
12.4 benzyl bromide 
13.3 biphenyl 




















Table 14. Pyrolysis products of mylar and polyester generated at high temperature and separated 
on the Carbowax-20M and SE-S4 columns. 
T„ T„ 
Insulation (min) Carbowax -20M (mini SE-54 
Mylar-139 3.3 octadecanol-1 3.2 2-tert-butyl-4-methylfuran 
8.7 naphthalene 3.6 4-methyl-2-heptanone 











terephthalate 3.6 styrene 3.2 cyclooctatetraene 
5.1 methylstyrene 3.9 benzaldehyde 
5.3 acetic acid 4.2 methylstyrene 
6.3 benzaldehyde 6.2 methyl benzoate 
7.0 m-divinylbenzene 10.1 benzoic acid 
7.5 methyl benzoate 10.5 p-methyl benzoic acid 
7.9 ethyl-2-keto-2-phenylethanoate 11.5 ethylbenzoic acid 
8.1 ethyl benzoate 13.4 methyl terephthalate 
10.2 methyl-3-(2,5-dimethyl benzoyl) butanoate 18.1 phenyl benzoate 
11.5 biphenyl 
Reliability Study on the LLNL Water-Supply System 
With this section, the reliability analysis of 
fire-sprinkler systems, a major portion of our fire-
risk analysis which began in FY 80, is completed. 
This reliability study illustrates the application of 
a powerful analytical tool called digraph-fault-tree 
methodology.11 Although it is specifically applied 
to the LLNL water-supply system, this method­
ology is ideal for complex systems analyses of 
large facilities or technologies such as special 
nuclear materials' safeguards, nuclear-power-
plant cooling systems, large-research-facility con­
trol systems, large-experiment designs, fire-
protection systems, etc. Dunglinson el al. not only 
describes the technique in detail but also presents 
examples of actual studies in the chemical process 
industry.12 
There are a number of disadvantages and de­
ficiencies in traditional fault-tree analysis that di­
graph alleviates. Since a detailed report will be 
published in the near future, we will present a 
summary of the digraph-fault-tree study. We ana­
lyzed the reliability of the Mocho water-supply 
system, LLNL's primary water supply, to establish 
whether adequate water would be available in the 
event of a major fire. The digraph procedure gen­
erated a fault tree of the water-supply system. 
The initiating-enabling-event-interval reliability 
approach is used to perform a probablistic evalua­
tion of the fault tree and to compute various sys­
tem reliability characteristics, such as the unavail­
ability of the water-supply system in the event of 
a major fire.12 
Mocho Water Supply and LLNL 
Monitoring System 
Figure 14 shows the water-supply system to 
LLNL. The main source of water to LLNL is the 
Hetch Hetchy Aqueduct, located 800 ft below 
ground level at the Mocho Pumping station, 
which is located 8 mi south of LLNL (Site A). The 
water is first pumped to the surface and into the 
standpipes (Site B). The purpose of the standpipes 
is to prevent water hammer at pump discharge. 
These two standpipes have a capacity of 20,996 
gallons each. The water flows by gravity from the 
standpipes to three main storage tanks (Site C) 
located 1/2 mi south of LLNL on the hill above 
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). Three stor­
age tanks have a total capacity of 1,238,800 gal­
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Figure 14. Site plan of existing system. 
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pressure necessary to supply LLNL. The tanks 
and standpipes are all at atmospheric pressure. 
The Central Control Room for the system is lo­
cated on-site in Bldg. 511 (Site D). 
As an alternate or standby water supply 
LLNL has water available from the Zone 7 water 
district. This water supply is used only during 
times when Hetch Hetchy water is unavailable 
due to tunnel maintenance, pump failure at the 
Mocho Pumping Station, or line failure between 
the Mocho standpipes and the storage tanks. Per­
sonnel on-site must activate the Zone 7 water sup­
ply manually. 
Figure 15 is a simplified schematic of the 
LLNL water-control system. The system consists 
basically of two feedback subsystems: (1) the 
water-level control for the Mocho standpipes and 
(2) the water-level control for the storage tanks. 
Any two of the three pumps at Site A controls the 
water level in the standpipes. Water level in the 
storage tanks is controlled by opening a valve that 
causes the Mocho standpipes to drain (Site B). 
Gravity feeds water as needed to LLNL from the 
storage tanks. Alarms, status indicators, and con­
trol signals are transmitted via frequency division 
multiplexed frequency shift tone equipment. Se­
lector switches, relays, water-level meters, and pi­
lot lights display the data being transmitted and 
received on a control console in Bldg. 511 (Site D). 
Manual commands from the control console can 
open or close valves at the water-storage tanks, 
and start and stop pumps at the Mocho pumping 
station. The water level in the standpipes and 
storage tanks is continuously monitored in Bldg. 
511. Any abnormal condition, such as a high- or 
low-water level in the storage tanks or in the 
standpipes, or any pump failure, initiates an au li-
ble and visual alarm on the control console. 
Analysis of the Mocho System 
We first had to understand and model the 
components of the water-supply-control system. 
Digraph-fault-tree analysis uses steps common to 
traditional fault-tree analysis. In assessing the 
Mocho water-supply system in the event of a ma­
jor fire, we found that 16 single events would 
cause the control loop that monitors storage tank 
level to fail. These failures would go undetected in 
Bldg. 511 because the feedback loop performs 
both control and detection functions. Based on 
this, we recommend that each tank have its own 
independent water-level sensor. If this is done, 
then we estimate that system availability would 
increase by a factor of 50. Restoring this indepen­
dent measurement would result in no single event 
minimal cut sets in the system in which failures 
would go undetected. 
We will briefly describe the digraph-fault-
tree methodology used to arrive at our recom­
mendations. 
Defining the Top Event 
The Top Event in this analysis is "Insufficient 
Supply of Water in Storage Tanks and No Detec­
tion of Same in Bldg. 511." Note that we did not 
consider earthquake effects on the Mocho system. 
Based on firefighting experience in the chem­
ical industry, LLNL's Fire Safety Division defined 
the amount of water necessary to extinquish a ma­
jor fire on-site: a continuous flowrate of 3500 gal­
lons per minute (gpm) for 4 hours, for a total of 
840,000 gallons. Besides, the 1,283,800-gallon ca­
pacity of the three storage tanks, standpipes A 
and B contain 41,992 total gallons, and 180,180 
gallons also sit in the line from the standpipes. 
In addition, we must include the makeup ca­
pacity of the two Mocho pumps (1 lead and 1 lag) 
during this 4-hour period. The lead pump, No. 3, 
has a capacity of 1100 gpm; each of the lag pumps. 
No. 1 or 2, has a 500-gpm capacity. In 4 hours, 
there is a total capacity of 1600 gpm, or 384,000 
gallons. Therefore, the total capacity of the whole 
system plus makeup is 1,889,972 gallons. 
During 1981, the maximum daily w?t"r con­
sumption was 950,000 gallons. Subtracting this 
amount from the Mocho system capacity leaves 
939,972 gallons to fight a major fire, which ex­
ceeds the recommended 840,000 gallons. If the 
system is working, then an adequate supply of 
water will be available for the postulated fire. 
In the 15 years the Mocho system has been 
operating, the storage tanks have drained dry 
twice due to human error. Such errors will lead to 
an inadequate supply of %vater in the storage 
tanks, and no one will detect it in Bldg. 511. Since 
the total of the pump makeup plus the standpipes 
and the line from the standpipes is only 606,000 
gallons, at least an additional 234,000 gallons must 
be in the storage tanks to meet the 840,000-gallon 
requirement (840,000 - 606,000 = 234.000). 
Therefore, if the level in the storage tanks drops 
below 234,000 gallons, there will not be enough 
water to extinquish the fire. 
A low-level condition in the tanks generates 
an alarm in Bldg. 511. Depending on the event(s) 
that caused the low level, LLNL personnel will 
take the appropriate measure, such as activating 
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Figure 15. Mocho-water control system. 
Understanding the Water-Supply System 
By taking tours of the entire water-supply 
system and interviewing LLNL personnel familiar 
with the system, we :dentified the following in­
formation, germane to digraph-fault-tree analysis. 
The independent measurement of water level 
in the storage tanks was removed which left only 
one sensor for three tanks. Pump No. 3, an 1100-
gpm pump, is the lead pump; a 500-gpm pump is 
the lag pump. In a No. 3-failure, either No. 1 or 
No. 2 becomes the lead pump. A visit to the Site A 
pumps is required in the event of a No. 3-failure. 
With No. 3 out of service, the water makeup to the 
standpipes takes longer but the system can be 
successfully operated in this mode. The main wa­
ter valve will not open if the standpipe is in a low-
water alarm condition or if the water tanks are in 
a high-water alarm condition. A spurious signal 
for either of the above conditions will cause the 
main water valve to close, and this results in the 
storage tanks standing at low level. In the event of 
a complete failure of the Mocho system, it takes 
approximately 15 min to cut in the Zone 7 water 
supply. The existing controls for the Mocho sys­
tem include over 100 mechanical relays for logic 
and timing. Understanding the operational se­
quence of the control system was important to an­
alyzing its reliability in any detail. 
Event Sequence for Storage-Level Control 
Water usage by SNL or LLNL will cause the 
water level in the storage tanks to drop. When the 
water level drops to 12 ft—6 in., a water-pressure 
transducer causes the automatic water valve to 
open. When the valve opens, water begins to flow 
from the Mocho standpipes. This water flows into 
the top of the No. 2 storage tank that is connected 
to No. 1 and No. 3 through service valves located 
at the bottom of the tanks. Water continues to 
flow through the automatic valve arid fill the 
three tanks until a level of about 14 ft is reached, 
at which time the automatic valve closes and no 
water flows. 
Event Sequence for Standpipe-Level Control 
As the automatic water valve at the storage 
tanks opens and water begins to flow from the 
Mocho standpipes, the water level in the stand-
pipes drop. When this level drops to 12 ft-6 in., 
the No. 3 lead pump starts pumping into the top 
of No. 1 standpipe, connected by bottom piping to 
No. 2 standpipe, from which WSLT flows to the 
storage tanks. However, water flows through the 
automatic water valve faster than No. 3 can pump, 
so the water level continues to drop. When the 
standpipe water level reaches 8 ft—8 in., the lag 
pump starts pumping. The combined output of 
both lead and lag pump is greater than the 
amount of water flow through the automatic 
valve, so the water level will now rise in the 
standpipe. When the water level reaches 12 ft-
10 in., the lag pump drops out. It will, however, 
continue to cycle on when the standpipe level 
drops to 8 ft—8 in. and cycle off as the level rises to 
12 ft-10 in. When the automatic water valve at the 
storage tanks closes, the level in the standpipe 
rises until it reaches 13 ft—5 in., at which point the 
lead pump cuts off and everything comes to a rest. 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
We performed a detailed Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA) on the Mocho system. 
LLNL personnel provided input for the FMEA. 
The results from this study provided much of the 
information to construct the digraph and fault tree 
and the probabilistic evaluation of the fault tree. 
The advantage of a FMEA is that LLNL personnel 
can provide information for the analysis without a 
knowledge of the digraph-fault tree procedure. 
System Digraph 
A digraph is a multivalued logic model useful 
in constructing fault trees of control systems. The 
digraph consists of nodes and edges (or arrows) 
that connect the nodes. A node represents a pro­
cess variable and the edge represents the <*ain, or 
the relationship between the nodes. A top event is 
defined as a deviation, i.e., a disturbance and is 
the starting variable in the digraph. The digraph is 
constructed deductively, similar to constructing a 
fault tree. The limit of resolution in the digraph is 
equipment failure, human error, or environmental 
conditions. 
The next step in the digraph procedure is to 
find the control loops in the digraph. A synthesis 
algorithm is devised to construct the digraph from 
the fault tree. Basically, the synthesis algorithm 
delineates how a control loop can cause or pass a 
disturbance resulting in the occurrence of the Top 
Event. 
The advantages of constructing a digraph is 
that the topology of the system variables is dis­
played and that the digraph resembles the system 
schematic. In addition, the digraph can consider 
multivalued logic and timing. By contrast, a fault 
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tree bears no relationship to the schematic, and it 
is difficult to consider multivalued logic and tim­
ing in fault-tree analysis. 
Digraph Construction 
The system digraph constructed for our study 
is similar in scope to the system digraph made for 
the LLNL Material Control Stud}/.13 The purpose of 
a material-control system is the prevention of 
theft of Special Nuclear Materials (SNM), like 
plutonium, from nuclear facilities. The material-
control system consists of procedures, monitors, 
computers, and a security force designed to stop 
theft, both covert and overt. 
The LLNL study focused on covert threat via 
an insider problem, and a prototype facility, called 
the Test Bed, was designed.1 3 The assessment of 
the Test Bed facility generated a system digraph 
with a Top Event Node, "Successful Theft of 
SNM from the Test Bed." Plutonium nitrate is 
stored in tanks that contained bubblers which 
measured static pressure or level. As the adver­
sary attempts to steal SNM, the tank level should 
decrease and generate an alarm. As the adversary 
commits acts necessary to steal the SNM, a series 
of negative feedforward loops are activated, called 
cancellation loops. These loops generate a safe­
guards response in preventing the adversary from 
stealing SNM. 
For the adversary to be successful, all these 
loops must fail. Failure can occur because of ran­
dom monitor failure, inadequate monitor-
measurement sensitivity, and adversary activity, 
including equipment tampering and collusion. 
The synthesis algorithm creates an AND gate in 
the fault tree each time a cancellation loop fails. 
In the Mocho study, we are concerned with 
human error and/or equipment failure that causes 
a low water level in the storage tanks. Also, we 
are concerned with failure of LLNL personnel to 
take action when a low water level occurs. Hence, 
we see that the methodology used in generating 
the material-control digraph is applicable directly 
to our analysis of the Mocho system. 
The Preliminary System Digraph 
The preliminary system digraph shows the 
structure of the detailed system digraph (Fig. 16). 
The top event variable in the digraph is "Flowrate 
to LLNL." The cycles in the digraph shov/ the two 
basic feedback loops- (1) the storage-tank-level-
control feedback loop and (2) the standpipe level-
control feedback loop. 
The sensed variable in both cases is static 
pressure and the manipulated variable is flowrate 
through the main control valve (for the storage 
tanks) or through the Mocho pumps (for the 
standpipes). An arrow from one variable (the in­
dependent variable) to the other variable (the de­
pendent variable) indicates that a change or devi­
ation in the independent variable causes a change 
in the dependent variable. 
The Detailed Digraph 
The detailed system digraph is segmented ac­
cording to sites: Site A, the Mocho pumps; Site B, 
the Mocho standpipes; Site C, the storage tanks, 
and Site D, Bldg. 511. Each digraph was made us­
ing the control system schematic. Because of the 
magnitude of the detailed system digraphs, only 
Site B (the Mocho standpipes) is included as an 
example in Appendix B. 
Fault-Tree Construction 
Appendix C displays the fault tree. The 
causes are displayed for the Top Event: 
• One or more storage tank drain valves 
closed and no detection of low storage tank level. 
• Insufficient flow through control valve 
and no detection in Bldg. 5 T 
Once, during the hisiu. of the system, a 
drain valve to a storage tank had been closed and 
the selector switch had not been changed to mea­
sure the water level in tank No. 1. This event 
caused the system to drain and simultaneously in­
activated the control loop that operates the valve 
since a full tank was being monitored. Hence, the 
remaining two tanks drained with no detection in 
Bldg. 511. The event, excessive system demand, 
has been included in the fault tree for complete­
ness. However, as described earlier, this event is 
no longer a possibility and so will be excluded 
from further consideration. 
It is important to note that if the storage tank 
level feedback loop is inactive or out of tolerance, 
then low level will occur without detection level 
in Bldg. 511. This is because the feedback loop is 
used simultaneously to (1) control level in the 
storage tanks, and (2) to send a signal to Bldg. 511 
in the event of low level. Hence, failure of the 
control elements on the feedback loop directly 
causes the top event to occur. If the control valve 
is open, and the loop fails out of tolerance, then 
the control loop will command the valve to close 
for a longer period of time than desired, resulting 
in low level in the storage tank. If the loop is inac­
tive, then the control valve will fail to open when 
it should, again resulting in low storage tank level. 
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Figure 16. Preliminary system digraph. 
A close-all-valve signal can result in the valve be­
ing closed too long. Two things can cause this: 
• A spurious high storage tank level signal. 
• A low standpipe level signal (generated 
either spuriously or due to actual failures that can 
cause low standpipe level). 
The cause of low standpipe level can be due 
to the feedback loop being out of tolerance or in­
active. Another cause of low tank level is an insuf­
ficient supply from the Mocho pumps. Note that 
we do not consider the case of drained Mocho 
standpipes. This is because a low standpipe level 
will cause the control valve to close and result in a 
low level in the storage tanks, which means that 
the fault tree logic for draining the standpipes will 
generate nonminimal cut sets since additional fea­
tures must occur to drain the standpipes. How­
ever, we do consider draining the pipelines from 
the standpipes. This can occur by simply closing 
the drain valve in standpipe No. 2. Since the 
standpipe level is constant in this case, the valve 
will continue to remain open until the pipe from 
the standpipe is drained. Note that throughout the 
fault tree, that when a detection loop fails, an 
AND gate is generated. This is a result of the 
feedforward operator described in Lambert.11 
Qualitative Fault-Tree Evaluation 
The fault tree contains 98 basic events. In ad­
dition, there are a total of 640 minimum-cut (min-
cut) sets. Min-cut set? are combinations of basic 
events that cause the Top Event to occur. Min-cut 
sets also are known as the system failure modes. 
The number of min-cut sets according to order is 
given below (order refers to the number of basic 





16 19 134 244 163 56 8 
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The 16 singie-event min-cut sets are single 
failures of control devices on the storage tank 
level feedback loop as described earlier. Of the 98 
basic events, 72 are initiating ev 'nts a.id 26 are 
enabling events. As described in Dunglinson et al., 
enabling events inactivate system mitigative or 
protective features but do not cause the Top Event 
to occur.12 for example, an inactive alarm or 
burned-out light does not cause low level but 
does fail the operator in the event of an alarm 
condition. For initiating events .ve must compute 
their frequency of occurrence-, for enabling events, 
their demand unavailability when the initiating 
event occurs. Reliability data for the 98 basic 
events were obtained from actual system experi­
ence during the last 15 years. 
For initiating events, we assume a fault dura­
tion time of 1 h. This includes the amount of time 
required for Bldg. 511 personnel to diagnose the 
cause of failure and take tction after a failure of 
the Mocho system has occurred. 
For the Top Event to occur, we assume no 
detection in Bldg. 511. However, low water pres­
sure will be detected on-site. The 1-h fault dura­
tion time corresponds to the time after detection 
has occurred on-site. The fault duration time for 
enabling events, 0.13 years, corresponds to the av­
erage time a failure can exist with an inspection 
interval of three months. 
Probabilistic Evaluation of the 
Fault Tree 
We used the computer code, IMPORTANCE, 
to evaluate probabilistically the Mocho system 
fault tree. 1 4 The following probabilistic measures 
were computed for the Mocho system: 
• Frequency of occurrence of initiating 
events, 
• Frequency of occurrence and mean occur­
rence time when an insufficient supply of water 
exists in the system, 
• Unavailability of the Mocho system when 
a major fire occurs, and 
• Ranking of initiating events, enabling 
events and min-cut sets according to their proba­
bilistic importance. 
Probabilistic importance assesses the quanti­
tative contribution of enabling events, initiating 
events, and min-cut sets to the occurrence fre­
quency of the Top Event. A probabilistic ranking 
according to importance is necessary in identify­
ing important contributors because it is virtually 
impossible for an analyst to visually inspect all 
the min-cut sets and to assess the relative con­
tribution of a component to system failure. This is 
particularly true for the Mocho system whose 
fault tree contains 9S basic events ami 640 min-cut 
Initiating-Event Fault Tree 
One fault tree was generated by simply tak­
ing the Boolean union of all initiating events. 
Hence thi- fault tree generated 72 single-event 
min-cui sets, since there were 72 initiating events. 
Table 15 displays the results of this fault tree. The 
Top-Event frequency of occurrence is 20.4 per 
year. We can think of this number as the number 
of challenges to the system yearly. This number is 
consistent with actual historical data. Table 15 
also lists the ranking of initiating events through 
rank 9. We see that the following events are 
important: 
• PG&E power failure. 
• Oiler relay failure (at Mocho pumps). 
• Noise on transmission line. 
We assume that the dominant failure cause of the 
close-all-valves transmitter is noise on the line. 
Mocho System Fault ^ree 
Table 16 lists the system-reliability charac­
teristics of the Mocho system fault tree. We pre­
dict that, on the average of 3.1 times per year, the 
Mocho system will have an inadequate supply of 
water to extinguish a major fire at LLNL. It must 
be pointed out that this number corresponds to a 
low level in the storage and not necessarily to a 
totally dry condition. Another measure of system 
adequacy is the demand unavailability of the sys­
tem given a major fire. The demand unavailability 
is calculated to be 3.6 X 10 A. We compare this 
number to the actual historical data. During the 
15-year life of the system, it has been dry twice. If 
we assume that the system was unavailable for 4 
hours each time, this results in a system unavail­
ability of (8 hours X 1 year/8760 hours) (system 
lifetime/15 years) = 6.1 X 10 5. 
Since this number does not include other 
times in which the storage tanks might have been 
low rather than dry, we see that the calculated 
unavailability, 3.6 X 10 4, ag ees reasonably well 
with the historical data, 6.1 X 10 5. Table 16 also 
ranks the initiating events through rank 9. We see 
that the basic events which are single-event min-
cut sets rank the highest. The one exception is the 
PG&E power failure that requires failure of the 
backup-power supply system. These singles are 
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Table 15. Results from the initiating-event fault tree. The mission time is 1= yrs. 
Failure rate Mean fault duration 
Rank Basic event description Importance per year Ihr) 
1 I-V-Cl PG&E power failure 0.232 5.00 1.00 
2 I-P-A2 Oiler failure relay PCVV # 1 0.155 3 3 3 - 0 0 
2 I-P-Al Oiler failure PCW # 3 0.155 3 3 3 1.00 
3 I -V-Dl Close all valve transmitter failure on 0.464 E-01 1.00 liffl 
3 I-V-D2 Noise on line to control va lve transmitter 0.464 E-01 1.00 1.00 
3 I-P-Dl Noise on line from standpipe to Bldg. 511 0.464 E-01 1.00 1.00 
4 1-P-A2 Control power contacts R3-1 transfer open 0.218 E-01 0.47 1.00 
4 I-P-Al Control power contacts R9-1 transfer open 0.218 E-01 0.47 LOO 
5 I-V-Cl High resistance WLT # 1 transducer 0.186 E-01 0.40 1.00 
5 I-P-Bl High resistance standpipe pressure transducer 0.186 E-01 0.40 1.00 
6 I-P-Bl Farmers dig up transmission l ine 0.155 E-01 0333 1.00 
7 I-P-Bl Power supply Auto-Mod #9109 failure off 0.124 E-01 0.267 1.00 
8 I-V-Cl Tank level module voltage high 0.617 E-02 0.133 1.00 
8 I-V-D2 Valve module contacts open 0.617 E-02 0.133 1.00 
8 I-P-Dl Pump switch module voltage high 0.617 E-02 0.133 1.00 
8 I-P-Bl Module #514 voltage signal high 0.617 E-02 0.133 1.00 
8 I-P-Bl Module #502 voltage signal high 0.617 E-02 0.133 1.00 
8 I-P-Al PCW # 3 motor fails to function 0.617 E-02 0.133 1.00 
8 I-V-D2 TCW S-tank level roc card voltage high 0.617 E-02 0.133 1.00 
8 I -V-Dl Standpipe level module failure (on) 0.617 E-02 0.133 0.13 yr 
8 I -V-Dl Tank level alarm module failure (on) 0.617 E-02 0.133 0.13 yr 
9 I-P-A2 Pressure switch out of tolerance 0.311 E-02 0.670 E-01 0.13 yr 
9 I-P-Al Pressure switch out of tolerance 0.311 E-02 0.670 E-01 0.13 yr 
9 I-V-C2 2400-Hz receiver fails l ow 0.311 E-02 0.670 E-01 1.00 
9 I-V-C2 Valve stem failure 0.311 E-02 0.670 E-01 1.00 
9 I-V-Cl Residual magnetism relay CR1 0 311 E-02 0.670 E-01 1.00 
9 I-V-D2 Relay coil CR7 open circuit 0.311 E-02 0.670 E-01 1.00 
9 I-V-Cl Open circuit relay CR1 0.311 E-02 0.670 E-01 1.00 
9 I -V-Dl CR5-3 contacts close 0.311 F-02 0.670 E-01 1.00 
9 I-P-Dl TSCW level receiver voltage high 0.311 E-02 0.670 E-01 1.00 
9 I-P-Al Lead pump receiver failure off 0.311 E-02 0.670 E-Ol 1.00 
9 I-V-Cl Level transmitter fails l o w 0311 E-02 0.670 E-01 1.00 
9 I -P-Dl CR3-2 contacts transfer open 0311 E-02 0.670 E-01 1.00 
9 I-P-Dl CR1A-1 contacts transfer open 0311 E-02 0.670 E-01 1.00 
9 I-V-C2 Agastat TDR-4 contacts transfer open 0311 E-02 0.670 E-01 1.00 
9 I-V-D2 Flow valve selector switch opens 0 3 1 1 E-02 0.670 E-01 1.00 
9 I-P-Al PSR6 contacts transfer open 0311 E-02 0.670 E-01 1.00 
9 I -V-Dl CR2A-1 contacts close 0311 E-02 0.670-01 1.00 
Table 16. Ranking of initiating events (the conditions are listed below). 
Insufficient level in storage tank and no detection 
Mean time to system failure = 2847.6 Hours 0.32506 years 
Mean time to system repair - 1.0367 Hours 0.43197 E-01 days. 
Rank Basic event description Importance 
Failure rate 
per year 

























D2 Noise on line to control valve transmitter 
CI PG&E power failure 
CI High resistance WLT #1 transducer 
D2 Valve module contacts open 
CI Tank level module voltage high 
D2 TCW S-tank level rec card voltage high 
CI Level transmitter fails low 
D2 TCW storage tank level receiver high 
C2 2400-Hz receiver fails low 
•CI Open circuit relay CR1 
•CI Residual magnetism relay CR1 
D2 Relay coil CR7 open circuit 
•C2 Agastat TDR-4 contact transfer open 
•D2 Flow valve selector switch opens 
•C2 Valve selector switch contacts open 
•C2 Valve stem failure 
•D2 Valve transmitter fails low 
•Dl Close all valve transmitter failure on 
•CI Storage tank(s) valved out 
CI Standpipe #2 valved out 
-Dl CR5-3 contacts close 
-Dl CR2A-1 contacts close 
Dl Noise on line from standpipe to Bldg. 511 
0.325 1.000 1.000 
0.163 5.00 1.000 
0.130 0.400 1.000 
0.432 E-01 0.133 1.000 
0.432 E-01 0.133 1.000 
0.432 E-01 0.133 1.000 
0.218 E-01 0.670 E-01 1.000 
0.218 E-01 0.670 E-01 1.000 
0.218 E-01 0.670 E-01 1.000 
0.218 E-01 0.670 E-01 1.000 
0.218 E-01 0.670 E-01 1.000 
0.218 E-01 0.670 E-01 1.000 
0.218 E-01 0.670 E-01 1.000 
0.218 E-01 0.670 E-01 1.000 
0.218 E-01 0.670 E-01 1.000 
0.218 E-01 0.670 E-01 1.000 
0.218 E-01 0.670 E-01 1.000 
0.921 E-02 1.000 1.000 
0.632 E-03 0.670 E-01 1.000 
0.617 E-03 0.670 E-01 1.000 
0.617 E-03 0.670 E-01 1.000 
0.617 E-03 0.670 E-01 1.000 
0.958 E-04 1.000 1.000 
failure of control devices on the tank level feed­
back loop which would go undetected in 
Bldg. 511. 
Table 17 ranks the enabling events. We see 
that failure of components in the backup power 
supply system, i.e., the inverter, battery, and bat­
tery charger are dominant enabling events. The 
next most important enabling event is failure of 
the operator in Bldg. 511 to respond to a low-level 
tank alarm. We assign a probability of 0.01 for this 
event, which is consistent with data given by 
Swain and Guttman. 1 3 Table 17 also ranks the 
most important min-cut sets. These min-cut sets 
include the important initiating and enabling 
events described above. 
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Table 17. Ranking of enabling events. 
Insufficient level in storage tank and no detection 
Enabler (sequential contributory) basic event importance (measure of interval reliability) 
Rank Basic event description Importance 
Failure rate 
per year 
Mean fault duration 
(yr) 
1 Inverter failure storage tank 
I Battery failure at storage tank 
1 Battery charger failure storage tank 
2 No operator response to low storage tank level 
3 Relay coil CR6-1 open circuit 
3 Storage alarm module inactive 
4 No operator response to low standpipe level 
5 Red light indicator low storage-tank burned out 
5 Tank low-level alarm inactive 
6 TDR1A-1 contacts fail to close 
6 TDR3A-1 contacts fail to close 
7 Red light indicating low standpipe level burned 
7 Standpipe low-level alarm inactive 
8 Tank selector switch in the wrong position 
9 No operator response to high tank level 
10 905-Hz OT-30 transmitter inactive 
10 FR3-2 contacts fail to close 
10 1325 OT-30 transmitter failure 
10 FR3-2 contacts fail to close 
II Red light indicating high tank level burned out 
11 Tank high level alarm inactive 
12 PCW #1 light burned out 
12 PCVV #3 light burned out 
12 PCW #3 alarm failure (off) 
12 PCW #1 alarm failure 
0.564 E-01 0.267 0.130 
0.564 E-01 0.267 0.130 
0.564 E-01 0.267 0.130 
0.433 E-02 — 0.100 E-01 
0.377 E-02 0.670 E-01 0.130 
0.377 E-02 0.670 E-01 0.130 
0.557 E-03 — 0.100 E-01 
0.522 E-03 0.267 0.130 
0.522 E-03 0.267 0.130 
0.490 E-04 1.000 0.130 
0.490 E-04 1.000 0.130 
0.170 E-04 0.267 0.130 
0.170 E-04 0.670 E-01 0.130 
0.149 E-04 6.00 1.000 hr 
0.120 E-04 — 0.100 E-01 
0.328 E-05 0.670 E-01 0.130 
0.328 E-05 0.670 E-01 0.130 
0.328 E-05 0.670 E-01 0.130 
0.328 E-05 0.670 E-01 0.130 
0.368 E-06 0.267 0.130 
0.368 E-06 0.670 E-01 0.130 
0.114 E-06 0.267 0.130 
0.114 E-06 0.267 0.130 
0.114 E-06 0.670 E-01 0.130 
0.114 E-06 0.670 E-01 0.130 
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Appendix A 
Forced-Ventilation Enclosure Fires 
Abstract 
Twenty-seven forced ventilation fire experiments were conducted in the LLNL fire 
test cell. A wide variety of fuels, ventilation rates and fire strengths were included. Experi­
mental results revealed that "quasi-steady-state" was not reached until approximately 2000 
sec after ignition. It was found that 80% ± 5% of the heat produced by the fire was 
deposited in the enclosure walls. Twice the stoichiometric ventilation was required to 
insure complete combustion of the provided fuel. Selected data was compared with predic­
tions from several computer models and the attributes and diffculties of each are 
discussed. 
Introduction 
The compartment fire experiments described here were conducted in the Lawrence Livermore Na­
tional Laboratory Fire Test Cell to assess the behavior of fire and fire products where enclosure ventilation 
is provided by an air-extraction system (Alvares, et al., 1981 and 1982). Such systems are standard in 
modern laboratory and power-generating facilities (Cleary, W. M., 1979). The 27 tests described here are 
part of an ongoing series of experimental fires begun in July 1981. The fires, located on the floor on the 
center line of the test cell, were either naturally burning pool fires or analogue pool fires where the fuel 
(either gas or liquid) was metered into a burner or pan. The purpose of the analogue pool fires was to 
control the fire strength and thereby to assess interaction between fire strength and ventilation rate. 
Designed experimental conditions ran the gamut from fully ventilated to severely ventilation-limited fires. 
Two requirements motivated these experiments: (1) to develop insight and experience with charac­
teristics of fires in extraction-ventilated enclosures, and (2) to produce quantitative data to evaluate current 
mathematical models modified to fit the extraction-ventilation mode. It is intended to use validated 
portions of the tested models as the initial component of a procedure to predict fire risk in large research 
and fabrication enclosures. 
Instrumentation 
Figure A-l is an artistic conception of enclosure geometry and Fig. A-2 is a detail of the extraction 
ventilation system. Clean air is introduced along the floor of the test cell, and combustion products are 
pulled out near the top of the cell by an axial fan. Extraction rate is controlled by a butterfly valve 
upstream of the fan. Exit gas flowrate from the test cell is measured by a sharp-edge orifice, and inlet flow 
rate is measured using a calibrated vane anemometer. Table A-l gives some pertinent properties of the 
enclosure. 
Table A-2 lists experiments conducted during the FY 1982 test series. The first five columns describe 
the tests done: fuel, type of fire, heat release rate, and initial forced ventilation rate in the exit duct. "Fire 
type" refers to the method of fuel control and fuel phase. 
In the tests designated "gas," bottled methane metered by critical orifice and in-line turbine meter 
was conveyed to a 0.28-m-diam rock-filled pan on the floor of the test cell. Gas entering the pan at the 
bottom becomes distributed uniformly through the rock bed as it flows to the rock bed surface. This 
burner was intended to be a pool fire analog. Unfortunately, the burner diameter was too small and at 
high fire strengths (i.e., high fuel-flow rates) the burner flame took on characteristics of a momentum jet 
rather than the intended bouyant plume. This complicated analyses of these methane-fueled fires. 
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EXPERIMENTAL 
VENTILATION SYSTEM FIRE TEST ROOM 
Experimental 
ductwork 






going to sewer 
PIT FOR WASTE WATER 
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*- Retaining tank 
for sprinkler 
water 
Figure A-l. Artist's conception of LLNL test cell geometry. 
4.5 m 
1.3 m 
Sharp-edged orifice -, 
Shape transition 
HEPA filter 
3.6 m 0.65 m square duct 
-8.0 m-







Figure A-2. Detail of LLNL extraction ventilation system. 
Table A-l. 1982 LLNL test-cell geometry information. 
1. The burn room was 4.5 m high, 4.0 m wide, and 6.0 m long. 
2. The exit opening (65 cm X 65 cm) was on the vertical centerline of the west wall (4.0 m wide X 4.5 m high), with its 
center 3.6 m above the floor. 
3. The inlet opening consisted of four horizontal rectangles (0.5 m long X 0.12 m high) with horizontal centerlines 0.1 m 
above the floor. 
4. For radiation calculations, the walls can be assumed to be completely black. 
5. The walls, floor and ceiling consist of a 10-cm thick A1 2 0 3 -S ,0 2 refractory with the foliowing estimated properties: 
Walls 
P (kg/m5) 1440 
k (W/m°k) 0.39 






Table A-2. 1982 Fire model test data. 
Steckler Exit Zone 6 % Heat o 2 
O V Fuel Fire layer g a s wall loss consumed co 2 CO CH, 
Test kW I/s formula type height (m) temp °C temp °C to walls (g / s ) (g/s) (g/s) <g/>> 
MOD3 60 100 CH, Burner 1.53 100 80 — 4.5 4.2 _ _ 
MOD2 55 500 CH, Burner 1.77 90 65 67 5.0 4.9 - — 
MOD10 100 100 C 3 H 8 0 Spray 1.27 100 80 87 2.4 5.8 - -
MOD11 100 500 C 3 H s O Spray 1.65 90 60 62 6.1 9.8 - -
MOD11A 100 500 C ,H s O Spray 1.48 100 80 64 3.0 8.7 - -
MODI 135 250 CH, Burner 1.45 , J | 130 90 84 8.7'" 8.7 — — 
MOD7 135 250 CH, Burner 1.24 140 105 82 9.3 9.6 - -
MOD24 200 110 Q H 1 8 Spray 1.05 150 145"" 83 10.3 10.5 0.3 0.07 
MOD25 200 90 C , H 8 0 Spray 1.24 160 1 6 0 , b l 86 14.2 12.5 1.7 0.03 
MOD4 230 100 CH, Burner 1.36' a l 170 150 95 13.8 10.7 1.3 0.3 
MOD23 400 130 C S H , B Spray 1.12 180 150 83 15.9 13.1 - 0.66 
MOD26 400 100 C 3 H 8 0 Spray 1.11 180 180"" - 17.8 14.7 5.3 0.37 
MOD6 460 100 CH, Burner 1.39'" 200 180 - 12.4' J' 9.9 1.5 0.58 
MOD6A 470 100 CH, Burner 1.39'-" 190 170 - 13.7'" 10.8 2-2 0.61 
MOD27 400 250 C , H 8 0 Spray 1.10 220 220"" 95 23.6 21.4 2.9 0.02 
MOD27A 400 250 C3H„O Spray 1.02 210 200"" 91 20.7 23.3 - 0.14 
MOD27B 400 250 C 3 H s O Spray 1.03 205 185"" 89 24.9 26.4 - 0.11 
MOD8 400 500 C 3 H 8 0 Spray 1.24 200 160 83 29.0 30.3 - -
MOD13 400 500 C , H B O Spray 1.12 230 180 79 20.9 31.5 - -
MOD14 400 500 C 8 H 1 8 Spray 1.04 200 150 79 12.4'" 27.1'" 
_Ul 0.04 
MOD14A 400 500 C 8 H 1 8 Spray 0.90 200 150 68 13 .9
, c l 23.4' c l _ i i i 0.04 
MOD5 455 500 CH, Burner 1.44 1 4' 280 210 83 3b.0 32.6 - 0.04 
MOD9 80u 500 C 3 H 8 0 Spray 1.10 280 225 88 55.2 50.5 13.2 2.0 
MCD9A 800 500 C,H a O Spray 1.47 280 220 87 44.8 46.9 4.3 1.9 
MOD15 800 500 C S H I 8 Spray 1.11 255 200 82 17.0 , c ' 29.4' c l _ l c l 1.7 
MOD12 800 100 C , H 8 0 Spray t j i - - - - - - -
MOD16 800 100 C 8 H 1 » Spray 
i j ) - - - - - - -
MOD17 600 500 C , H 8 0 Pool 1.08 250 195 63 5 .6 l c l 6.8"' z 2 C c l — 
MOD18 400 100 C 3 H s O Pool 1.12 160 150 81 9 . 3 , c l 7.6 | C | 4.3'" -
MOD19 1100 500 C » H I 8 Pool 1.09 255 200 - 36.3 29.0 9.9 -
'•" Equilibrium not reached. 
I b l Test run after polystyrene. 
I r l Leak in gas analysis line. 
rotometer to an opposed jet nozzle located in the center of a 0.91-m-diam steel pan with a 15-cm lip on the 
floor of the test cell. Liquid from the nozzle is sprayed on a plane normal to the orifice axes with a uniform 
radial distribution. Ignition is by a remotely energized electric arc. The atomized spray quickly evaporates 
and burns before it contacts pan surfaces; and the resulting fire has every appearance of a natural pool 
fire. Figure A-3, plates "a" through "d," show photographs of the opposed jet nozzle, the pan with jet 
installed, the opposed jet nozzle spray pattern, and the resulting fire. 
For tests designated as "pool," approximately 40 liters of liquid fuel were placed in the 0.91 -m steel 
pan. The intial fuel level came to 7 cm from the top of the 15-cm-high wall. The effects of the pan walls on 
the fuel-burning rate become asymptotic for lip heights greater than 7 cm for this size pool (i.e., 1/d > 
0.08), (Orloff, 1981). The mass pyrolysis rate was determined using a calibrated load cell. 
Instrumentation of the enclosure and ventilation circuits was extensive and consisted of gas 
and surface thermocouples, calorimeters, radiometers, combustion gas and oxygen detectors, fuel and 
ventilation-flow sensors, and a video camera for recording the fire shape. Data were recorded and reduced 
on a PDP-11 computer. Table A-3 summarizes sensor and instrumentation parameters. Previous work 
(Alvares, et «/., 1982) indicate that the majority of energy produced by fire (up to 80%) is absorbed by the 
enclosure surfaces. To confirm this finding and assess the distribution of the surface energy deposition, 23 
thermocouples were installed on test cell surfaces in the array displayed in Fig. A-4. These thermocouples 
were simply pressed onto the Kastolite surface and held there with spring tension. This distribution was 
designed assuming a symmetrical energy source field. 
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Figure A-3. Photographs of spray injection system. 
For fires designated "spray," liquid fuel from a pressurized reservoir flows through a calibrated 
The standard experimental procedure depended on the fuel involved. Essentially, ventilation and fuel 
flow rates were initially fixed, and pre-calibration of gas analyzers was done before the test cell was 
secured for the test. Then, five minutes of pre-ignition operation was allowed to insure stable instrument 
operation and to provide initial data values. Fuel flow and spark ignition were simultaneously initiated 
and data were recorded until quasi-steady-state conditions were reached. 
Experimental Results 
Figures A-5(a)-(d) are examples of data produced. MOD 27B was an isopropanol spray fire with the 
fire strength set to 400 kW and the ventilation rate maintained at 250 L/s. Figure A-5(a) contains typical 
gas and wall temperatures within the enclosure. Figures A-5(b)-(d) show the consumption and production 
of combustion gases. (Note the relativley low temperatures, <300°C.) Figure A-5(c) shows the inlet and 
outlet air flows. 
One feature common to all tests is the appearance of a reversal inlet air flow spike, whereupon fire 
initiation the inlet flow is reduced, and sometimes, as in the case of Mod 27B, flow is reversed. The 
magnitude of this negative peak varies directly with fire strength. It is caused by the need to reduce the 
mass in the test cell to keep a constant energy per unit volume in the approximately constant pressure test 
cell. Also, at early times, the wall temperature may rise faster than the gas air temperature, indicating that 
initially direct thermal radiation heat transfer from the fire to the walls is important. 
The exit air flow was adjusted to compensate for reduced flow because of wetting and plugging nf a 
particulate filter located between the test cell and the extraction fan. All tests where the fire strength was 
greater than 400 kW had this problem, even though new filters were installed prior to each test. 
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Table A-3. Instrumentation for 1982 fire model test series. 
Parameter Instrument Characteristics Range Accuracy Stability 
Ul 
Ceiling and wall 
temperature 
Compartment gas temp, 
(horizontal array at 2.1 
and 3.7 m elevation) 
Compartment gas temp, 
(vertical rake) 
Pressure 
Wall pressure just up­
stream of HEPA filter 
Volumetric exhaust flux 
Intake air velocity 







Liquid fuel flow 
Gas (CH,) fuel flow 







shielded from plume 
radiation by alumi­
num screen 
One pilot tube at 2.1 





fice 15.2 m down­
stream of exhaust 
inlet and downstream 
of HEPA filter 
R. M. Young vane 
anemometer 
Beckman Model 402 
Beckman Model 
OM-11 
Beckman Model 86 I, 
exhaust air sample 
Beckman Model 864 
Beckman Model 402 




Brooks full view ro­
tameter Model 1100-





wire gauge 22 0.6 + 
0.01 mm bead 
Same as above 
Chrome-Alumel 
Junction, American 
wire gauge 36 
Lower threshold 
0.2 m/s 
Exhaust sample 3/m 
downstream duct in­
let, 10% full-scale re­
sponse in 1 s 
90% full-scale re­
sponse in 80 s 
90% full-scale re­
sponse in 0.5 s 
90% full-scale re­
sponse in 1 s 
Calibrated at constant 
pressure metering 
volume change of de­
canted fuel 
No gas pressure and 
temperature 
information 
Placed in hot layer 
outside fire plume 
-18 to 1200°C 
-18 to 1200°C 
-18 to 1200°C 
0.01 to 3000 psi 
0.01 to 3000 psi 
1 to 50 m/s linear 
range 
0 to 25% 
0 to 100% 
0 to 100% 
0 to 25% 
0 to 2000 ml/min 
0 to 200 ml/min 






1 to 5% ppm in clean 
air 
± 5% of measured 
value 
±5% of measurement 
±1% of measurement 
t 2% of measured 
value at ambient 
conditions 
l%of measured value 
at ambient conditions 
3% of measurement 
±0.1 psi for DC power 
changes between 22 and 
35 V 
Same as above 
Recalibrated after each 
test 
Recalibrated after each 
test 
Recalibrated after each 
test 
* 1% of full scale 
0.5% of full scale 
0.5% of full scale 
5% of full scale 
Figure A-4. Detail of wall thermocouple placement and wall zone areas used for Duhamel 
analysis. 
MOD 27B is an example of an underventilated fire, where CO is produced and CH 4 is found in test 
cell exhaust, Fig. A-5(d). To identify when to expect ventilation-controlled conditions, stoichiometric con­
ditions were precalculated for each fire strength and ventilation. In Fig. A-6, the solid line is the stoichio­
metric line for methane, which needs the most oxygen per gram of fuel. Fires below this line were 
expected to be under-ventilated and fires above this lin? fully ventilated. This, however, was not the case. 
For these forced-ventilation tests, the inlet ventilation needed to be twice that of stoichiometry (the 
dashed line), or incomplete combustion occurred, as MOD 27B shows. This suggests that air entrained by 
the fire does not completely react with fuel gases in the reaction plume, and that some of the entrained 
oxygen survives the fire to be pumped into the upper layer intact. This is confirmed by oxygen sensors in 
the upper layer and exit duct. 
Figures A-7(a) and A-7(b) contrast an over-ventilated fire with an under-ventilated fire. (Mod 8; 400 
kW at 500 L/s and Mod 12; 800 kW at 100 l/s). Mod 12 was terminated at approximately 300 s for safety 
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Figure A-5(a). Example temperature history for MOD 27B. 
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Figure A-5(c). Example minor gas (CO and CH4 history) for MOD 27B. 
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Figure A-5(d). Example airflow history for MOD 27B. 
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Figure A-6. Conditions of fire relative to stoichiometric fuel/air ratio. 
reasons. All tests were terminated if total hydrocarbon level exceeded 10 000 ppm, the lower ignition limit 
of methane, to avoid the potential danger of accidental deflagration. Note the rapid rise of CO and CH, in 
Fig. A-7(b) for Mod 12. These signals illustrate extreme ventilation-limited conditions. In comparison. Mod 
8 exhibits relatively well-behaved data; e.g., very low production of CO and CH 4. 
Figures A-8(a) and A-8(b) shows data from two fires with different fuels at the same initial ventilation 
rate and fire strength. MOD 26 is an isopropanol (C 3H sO) spray fire and MOD 23 is an isooctane (C 8H l g) 
spray fire. These two very different fuels give remarkably similar results for most measurements. Table A-
3 contains tabular data for the other tests done during the 1982 series. 
Figure A-9(a) shows temperature profiles of rake thermocouples at various times for Mod 27B. Two 
vertical columns (rakes) of thermocouples were positioned symmetrically east and west of the burn pan. 
Each rake contained 15 5-mil chrome-alumel thermocouples at 30-cm vertical intervals. The shape of the 
cell thermal profile or "upper layer" is quickly established (within 250 s) and remains essentially un­
changed throughout the fire. For MOD 27B this upper layer temperature is 200''C, and rises to only 250°C 
at long times. One characteristic of these tests is that the temperature interface between the hot and cold 
layers is not well defined. It is more of a temperature gradient that asymptotically approaches infinity in 
the upper layer. In Fig. A-9(a), the history of the temperature profile to 1500 s shows this well. (Note that 
from here on all time references are from the start of the fire.) To make model evaluation easier, Steckler's 
two-layer equivalency technique (Alvares, et al., 1982) was applied to these temperature profiles. This 
technique simplifies profile data into the two distinct layers used by most zone models. The results of this 
procedure are shown in Fig. A-9(b) for test MOD 27B at 1500 s. Table A-4 summarizes these calculated 
Steckler two-layer data for all tests in thisseries. 
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Figure A-7(a>. Comparison of major gas ( 0 2 and CO,) histories for MOD 8, 
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Figure A-7(b). Comparison of minor gas (CO and CH4) histories for MOD 8, 
an overventilated fire, and MOD 12, an underventilated fire. 
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Figure A-8(a). Comparison of major gas (O, and C0 2 ) histories for similar 
isopropanol and isooctane fires. 
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Figure A-8(b). Comparison of temperature histories for similar isopropanol 
and isooctane fires. 
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Figure A-9(b). Actual room gas temperature profile and Steckler two-layer equivalent profile for 
MOD 27B at 1500 s. 
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Table A-4. Steckler two-layer temperatures. 
Height of 
T ime Lower layer Upper layer layer interface 
Test (sec) temp <°C) tempCC) (m) 
MOD 1 900 59 134 1.58 
MOD 2 1700 48 87 1.77 
M O D 3 2200 59 107 1.53 
M O D 4 1700 84 198 1.39 
MOD 5 1700 111 294 1.51 
M O D 6 400 105 253 1.54 
M O D 6 A 500 99 232 1.52 
MOD 7 1700 70 156 1.52 
M O D 8 1200 116 237 1.41 
MOD 9 600 142 297 1.17 
M O D 9 A 800 147 292 1.22 
MOD 10 1500 75 118 1.50 
M O D 11 1200 54 91 1.65 
M O D 11A 1200 58 103 1.48 
M O D 12 300 128 240 1.26 
MOD 13 1200 129 245 1.49 
M O D 14 1300 122 214 1.15 
MOD 14A 1200 119 213 1.22 
M O D 15 800 155 272 1.15 
MOD 16 300 135 215 1.15 
M O D 17 1500 118 262 1.21 
MOD 18 2300 107 202 1.35 
M O D 19 1300 154 284 1.26 
MOD 20 1700 63 98 1.45 
M O D 23 1200 123 200 1.26 
M O D 24 3300 114 189 1.25 
M O D 25 2800 107 191 1.14 
M O D 26 1300 113 202 1.08 
M O D 27 1200 142 258 1.28 
M O D 27 2200 148 258 1.20 
M O D 27A 1500 124 242 1.20 
MOD 27A 2300 119 229 1.15 
M O D 27B 2700 133 256 1.10 
To validate the accuracy of the instrumentation, stringent-mass, energy, and species-balancing criteria 
were applied to all raw data (Alvares, et al., 1982). Mass flows in and out were corrected for temperature 
and density changes and checked to balance. Gas species are similarly checked to insure elemental 
balances. Measured fire strengths were compared against calculated fire strengths from C 0 2 and CO 
production and 0 2 consumption. This procedure provides a good measure of the data quality and identi­
fied when the quasi-steady-state was reached. The definition of quasi-steady-state is taken as the estab­
lishment of conditions where oxygen consumption and combustion gas formation becomes constant and 
species balancing occurs. For these tests, this occurs approximately 2000 s after the start of the fire and is 
highly dependent on the ventilation rate. The long time necessary to reach quasi-steady-state conditions is 
due to the large volume of the test cell. Balancing also indicated that approximately 80% of the energy 
from the fire was deposited in the thick Kastolite enclosure walls. 
To validate these findings, the total heat flux to the walls was calculated using the wall surface 
temperature histories and Duhamel integral techniques (Arpaci, V. S., 1966, and Nikanja, M. and Greif, R., 
1978). Wall temperatures were extrapolated and averaged (McGehee, D„ 1983) to represent the eight zones 
shown in Fig. A-4. 
Figure A-10 shows four typical wall temperature curves for Mod 27B. The four zones represented are: 
1 - the ceiling above the fire; 4 - top near wall; 5 - middle near wall; and 6 - bottom near wall. All eight 
zones behave similarly at early times with a rapid temperature rise, (~ 50 ̂ C in 4 min), before beginning 
their long approach to a quasi-steady distribution. The middle wall zone, 5, initially leads the top wall 
zone, 4, due to its greater view factor for direct radiation from the flame. However, after —10 min, zone 4 
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Figure A-10. Zonal wall temperatures for MOD 27B. 
catches up with zone 5 because of increased radiation from the ceiling and hot upper layer. At long times, 
the upper zone, 4, temperatures exceed the middle zone, 5, by ~10°C. 
The fast, early rise is attributed to the cold walls experiencing direct flame radiation, much like 
coming inside during winter to stand in front of a fireplace. Numerical cur'e fitting was done mimicking 
the two time regime behaviors shown in Fig. A-10, with a linear rise followed by a slow "baking" as the 
half power of time. 
The data from each thermocouple in each zone was fit with 
K = bt, 
and 
fl„ = c + ft 1/2 
for t < t„ 
for t > t„ 
(la) 
(lb) 
where 01V = T w — T w i , is the surface temperature increase above its initial value. t t r is ~ 3 min. This time 
dependence, along with approximate wall thermal properties, in the standard Duhamel integral 
V I T / t Jo 
M t ) pojt) - 0w(s) 
Jo 2(t-s) ,3/2 
ds 
gives a local heat flux 
q ;'(t) = '4b-t up cMl/2, 
and 





in + <2 + ( 
t
 i / 2 ( t 1 / 2 - t 1 / 2 V 
2.57 — sin — - — 
( t - t , a/2 




where t,r = (f + (f2 + 4bc) , / 2/(2b)) 2 . 
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To compensate for the error of concentrating the thermocouple array on that portion of the wall 
closest to the fire, a steric factor of 0.5 for the walls was introduced. This lowered the flux calculated from 
Eq. (3) to the level shown in Fig. A-11. The floor zones were deleted as negligible. Each thermocuople's 
flux was calculated and the flux average applied to the zone surface area to determine the total power into 
each zone as a function of time. Summing over all zones then gave the total power history to the test cell 
surface (McGehee, D., 1983). 
Figure A-12 shows a comparison of this calculation with the estimate of Q determined from data 
obtained using the species, temperature and flow measurements in the exit duct for test 27B, 400 kW at 250 
1/s. The total heat flux to the walls exhibits a peak that occurs at roughly the same time as the peak in the 
air inflow. Initially, both the convective and radiative heat transfer is large because of the large tempera­
ture difference between gas and surfaces and the direct view from the fire. The gas and wall temperatures 
rise in parallel and are somewhat interdependent. When the rate of gas temperature rise is reduced 
( — 250 s), the rate of change in the wall temperature is slowed down, indicating a significantly reduced 
rate of heat transfer. As noted earlier, the magnitude of the air flow peak is directly dependent on fire 
strength. The same relationship holds for the heat rate peak corresponding to the heat transfer transition 
time, thus illustrating that the enclosure volume is so large that no ventilation control can occur during the 
first minutes of burning. 
In addition, Fig. A-12 shows the results of calculating the convective fraction of the total heat flux 
using published correlations (Cooper, 1982 and Zukoski, et al., 1975). The radiative fraction was then 
calculated as the difference between the total and the convective flux. In all cases, net radiation is from 2 
to 4 times greater than convection. Spot checks with radiometer measurements indicate these radiation 
estimates are of the correct magnitude. 
Table A-5 gives the flux distribution among zones and the partition of the absorbed energy into net 
radiation and convection at the long times indicated for several different tests. The fire strengths and mass 
flow rates for these tests are given in Table A-2. The last two columns give the calculated and measured 
fluxes averaged over the wall and ceiling surface areas. This agreement is good, considering the geometric 
averaging required and the uncertainties in measuring the surface temperatures. It is also difficult to get 
accurate average wall properties (Somerton, 1958). In the future, more complete radiation calculations are 
planned, both because of their own importance and their value in making a critical, full-scale evaluation 
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Figure A-12. Results of Duhamel analysis for MOD 27B. 
of the convective correlations. Further tests are planned with a more representative thermocouple array 
embedded very slightly beneath the enclosure surface. 
The literature suggests these tests are unique. The low inlet-high outlet ventilation pattern does not 
allow intermixing of the hot and cold layers. The thick Kastolite walls absorb 80% of the energy of the fire, 
keeping gas temperatures below SSO'C. Half an hour is required to reach quasi-steady-state because of 
the large room volume. Having established these data as reliable rnd representative for these specific 
conditions, they are is used to compare several fire model predictions. 
Enclosure-Fire-Model Validation 
The model selection procedure used was unsophisticated. Data were sent to any organization or 
institution that expressed an interest in attempting to predict fire characteristics from the initial conditions 
of our tests. Three tests were selected for model validation analysis: MOD 8, MOD 9, and MOD 27B. These 
tests represent ventilated (400 kW at 500 L/s), and under-ventilated (800 kW at 500 L/s), and (400 kW at 
250 L/s) fires. The six models compared in this report consist of those respondents who had the ability to 
modify their model to account for the unusual condition of forced ventilation. Five of the six codes were 
two-layer zone models from Harvard (Mitler and Emmons, 1981, and Mitler, 1982), LANl. (Krause, 1982), 
LLNL (Creighton, 1982), Cal Tech II (Zukoski, 1980), and PNL (Orzawski, et al., 1982). One code has a 
single layer zone code, Cal Tech I (Zukoski, 1982). 
Eight fire parameters were selected for comparison of the models. They are listed here in order of 
their importance, both as model indicators and as parameteis for risk analysis. 
1. Upper layer gas tempreature (°C). 
Fire strength (kW). 
Total heat loss to walls (kW). 
Oxygen concentration (% vol). 
Lower iayer height (m). 
Inlet ventilation (g/sec). 
Wall temperature (°C). 
Lower layer gas temperature (°C). 
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Table A-5. Calculated heat fluxes. 
Ceiling Wall Cell 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Fluence Fluence Fluence Calc. Meas. 
Zone Number 8 8 8 18 18 18 18 18 24 90 114 Avg. Avg. 
Area (nr) (kW/m 2) (kW/nr> (kW/nr) (kW/rtr) (kW/nr) (kW/m 2) (kW/m 2) (kW/m 2) (kW) (kW) (kW) Flux Flux 
Mod 7 at 1700 sec 
Convective 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 13.6 27.0 40.6 0.4 
Radiative 2.3 1.4 2.3 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.2 48.0 37.8 85.8 0.7 
Total 3.0 2.0 2.7 1.0 0.9 0.5 0.8 0.4 61.6 64.8 126.4 1.3 1.1 
Mod 8 at 1100 sec 
Convective 1.8 1.2 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.5 31.2 59.4 90.6 0.8 
Radiative 4.8 5.5 5.2 1.4 1.8 1.1 1.3 1.3 124.0 124.2 248.2 2.2 
Total 6.6 6.7 6.1 2.3 2.4 1.7 2.0 1.8 155.2 183.6 338.8 3.0 3.1 
Mod 9 at 550 sec 
Convective 3.1 1.9 1.4 1.3 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.6 51.2 81.0 132.2 1.1 
Radiative 9.0 11.6 11.0 3.8 3.5 2.3 3.1 2.8 252.8 279.0 531.8 2.2 
Total 12.1 13.5 12.4 5.1 4.4 3.1 4.0 3.4 304.0 360.0 664.0 5.B 5.5 
Mod 17 at 2000 sec 
Convcclive 1.6 1.4 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.5 32.8 55.8 88.6 0.8 
Radiative 6.8 6.0 5.1 2.2 2.2 1.1 2.3 1.2 143.2 162.0 305.2 2.7 
Total 8.4 7.4 6.2 3.0 2.8 1.8 2.8 1.7 176.0 217.8 393.8 3.5 4.7 
Mod 27B at 2000 sec 
Convective 1.9 1.4 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4 34.4 54.0 88.4 0.B 
Radiative 3.3 3.4 3.2 1.6 1.6 1.0 1.4 1.3 79.2 124.2 203.4 1.8 
Total 5.2 4.8 4.2 2.4 2.2 1.6 2.0 1.7 113.6 178.2 291.8 2.6 2.6 
Table A-6 contains quasi-steady-state test data and long-time model predictions for the three com 
parison tests. These tables present an overview of a model's abilities and performance relative to the other 
models, but they can be deceiving. A time history is a better indication of a model's accuracv. An example 
of this is illustrated in Table A-b(b). The upper layer temperature predictions of Cal Tech I and 11, LAN1. 
and LLNL appear to agree well with the data. However, in Fig. A-13 (a)-(b), it is clear that the Ca! Tech i 
program is simply intersecting the other predictions and the real data on the way to higher temperatures. 
The Cal Tech I program does not appear to approach quasi-steady state. LANL, PNL and Harvard have 
substantially better upper layer temperature "temporal shapes" but predict temperatures too high or too 
low. For all tests, Harvard's "temporal shape" agrees well with the data; however, it is significantly lower 
(80-120°C) than the data. It needs some improvement to allow more energy into the hot layer. 
Looking at Table A-6, the Harvard code appears to have the best prediction of the fire strength in the 
ventilation limited condition. The Cal Tech I code requires that the oxygen concentration goes to zero 
before oxvgen starvation occurs, limiting the fire strength. The oxygen concentration never approaches 
zero in these tests since ventilation control limits the burning rate. A realistic empirical O, limit could be 
incorporated into this code to improve it. The LLNL, L A N L and Cal Tech II codes do not account for the 
possibility of oxvgen starvation 
When comparing the prediction for heat loss to the walls it was clear that models which incorrectly 
predicted the fire strength would have problems. Therefore, they are compared using the ratio of the heat 
lost to the walls to the predicted fire strength. The Cal Tech 1 code was clearly better than the others in 
this regard (80-86%). The Harvard code (50%) was again troubled by its lack of energy in the hot layer, as 
was PNL (30-60%). The other three models require this ratio as an input parameter. The Borhamwood 
Fire Research Station finite difference program (Cox, 1983) was ru'-> for MOD 8 and predicted the heat loss 
quite well. The datra showed a 75% heat loss to fhe walls, and Cox predicted 76-77%. 
Figure A-14 (a)-(b) compares the actual oxygen depletion curves for MOD 9 and MOD 27B with the 
four models that attempt to predict it. None of the programs predict oxygen depletion very well in these 
underventilated tests. The Cal Tech I model does, however, predict a consistently low depletion value (i.e., 
more O, consumption). This is a more useful program from a risk-analysis viewpoint in that it doesn't 
underestimate the hazard. The PNL prediction for MOD 9 diverges from the data and other predictions at 
11% O z, illustrating this model's threshold of ventilation control. 
No model was completely successful in predicting all eight parameters evaluated. In fact, no model 
was consistently close (±5%) on any parameter except fire strength. Most models were inconsistent, 
giving good predictions on one parameter and missing altogether on others. The overall performance 
evaluation process was very difficult. Nevertheless, it is possible to tentatively order the models relative to 
their usefulness in predicting the results of forced ventilation enclosure fires. In this order, the Cal Tech I 
and the PNL codes were the most successful. The Harvard and LANL codes were found to be moderately 
useful, whereas the modest abilities and questionable results of the LLNL and Cal Tech II codes make 
their usefulness limited. 
Conclusions 
These t .'sts provide new insights on the complexities of a fire in forced ventilation enclosures and 
should prove useful in future fire risk analyses of fires in these enclosures. They provide a firm foundation 
for further tests. Additional tests have been completed, in which the position of the fire was moved within 
the room and the location of ventilation ducts and wall thermocouples was changed. Preliminary results 
indicate that sharper thermal layering occurs when the fire is elevated. Subsequent tests will better define 
the interaction of ventilation and fire locations. 
Data comparisons also point out the deficiencies of the current fire models to predict the important 
parameters of a fire in a forced ventilation enclosure. Some of the difficulties are minor problems with 
simple solutions; others are more complex. As more data become available, these problems may be 
solved. None of the current programs, however, are ready for unqualified use in fire hazard risk analyses. 
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Table A-6. Comparison of model predictions with tests data MOD 8. 
U l 
Units Data Harvard Cal Tech I PNL LANL Cal Tech II LLNL 
Time (sec) 1200 1200 1200 1000 500 800 300 
Upper Layer Temp (°C) 232 152 228 272 163 160 191 
Fire strength (kW) 400 395 399 400 391 400 400 
Heat loss to walls (kW) 300 182 317 126 313 320 320 
Oxygen concentration (% vol) 14.0 12.1 13.3 16.3 14.7 - -
Lower layer height (m) 1.30 0.36 - 0.80 2.84 0.30 0.99 
Wall temperature CO 135-180 113 151 - - ~ -
Lower layer temp (°C) 112 21 228 272 80 21 21 
Inlet spike min (sec) (40) (2) (50) (20) (11) (30) -
Inlet spike (g/sec) 25.0 90 100 
MOD 9 
- 8 0 75 344 
Units Data Harvard Cal Tech 1 PNL LANL Cal Tech II LLNL 
Time (sec) 600 600 600 600 630 800 300 
Upper Layer Temp <°C) 299 175 351 267 329 304 388 
Fire strength (kW) 700 482 801 556 786 800 800 
Heat loss to walls (kW) 600 231 682 327 629 640 640 
Oxygen concentration (% vol) 6.5 7.6 4.0 10.8 7.9 - -
Lower layer height (m) 1.29 0.33 - 0.75 2.25 0.25 0.R7 
Wall temperature (°C> 170-270 126 215 - - - -
Lower layer temp (°C) 146 34 351 34 136 34 34 
Inlet spike min (sec) (15) (2) (20) (20) (11) (30) -
Inlet spike (g/sec) -420 -554 -570 
MOD 27B 
-180 -400 117 
Units Data Harvard Cal Tech I PNL LANL Cal Tech 11 LLNL 
Time (sec) 2200 2200 2200 2200 1800 800 300 
Upper Layer Temp (°C) 252 15B 287 222 282 287 287 
Fire strength (kW) 330 341 399 295 391 400 400 
Heat loss to walls (kW) 270 165 329 154 313 320 320 
Oxygen concentration (7r vol) 11.0 6.8 9.4 11.3 9.6 - -
lower layer height (m) 1.22 0.28 - 0.64 0.73 0.15 0.75 
Wall temperature <°C) 180-210 123 206 - - - -
Lower layer temp (°C) 136 18 287 87 I l l 18 18 
Inlet spike min (sec) (15) (2) (20) (20) (20) (30) — 
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Figure A-13(a). Comparison of several.models' gas temperature predictions 
for MOD 27B. 
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Figure A-13(b). Comparison of several models' gas temperature predictions 
for MOD 9B. 
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Figure A-14(a). Comparison of several models' oxygen depletion predictions 
for MOD 27B. 
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Figure A-14(b). Comparison of several models' oxygen depletion predictions 
for MOD 9. 
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Appendix B 
Mocho Standpipe Digraph 
The bold arrows in Fig. B-l represent normal information flow and logic. That is, if the system is 
operating normally, these bold lines describe the normal cause-and-effect between dependent and inde­
pendent system variables. The detailed system digraph is rearranged around the following control loops: 
(1) control loop to turn the lead pump on and off, (2) control loop to turn the lag pump on and off, and 
(3) control loop to open and close the main cor.trol valve. 
Disturbances and Upset Conditions 
After thes- control loops, which are negative feedback loops, are identified, events such as equipment 
and instrument failure are included. These events can affect the control loops by either creating a low-
level condition in the standpipes or storage tanks, or can shut down the system. These events are circled 
by dashed lines. As described in Dunglinson et al., these are initiating events that upset conditions which 
in turn causes the Top Event to occur. 
Modeling Information Flow to the Operator in Bidg. 511 
Alarms in Bldg. 511 indicating upset conditions are modeled as feedforward loops. These feedforward 
loops symbolize mitigative actions the operator must take to restore an adequate water supply such as 
(1) manually opening the main control valve, or (2) cutting in Zone 7 in the event of failure of the Mocho 
system. In order for the operator to fail to take the corrective action, failure of the alarm system or 
operator must occur. The events are modeled as zero gain events, symbolized by "0." Zero gain events 
represent events which nullify the information flow. 
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Figure B-l. Digraph of Site B Mocho standpipc. 
Appendix C 
Water-Supply-System Fault Tree 
Insufficient supply in storage 
tank and no detection of 
insufficient supply in Bldg. 511 
I 
Or top 
One or more storage 
tank drain valves 
closed and no 








1 HERR 1 
No detection 
of low tank level 




Control devices on 
tank level negative 
feedback loop fail 




















1 RELAY 1 
No operator response 
to low storage tank 
level alarm 
1 HERR2 
Insufficient flow through 
control valve and no 






Excessive system demand 








No detection of low 
/3^—storage tank level in 
( F i g . 2 , 9 ) B l d 9 - 5 1 1 
orG-1-6 
Tank selector switch 





Tank low level 
alarm inactive 
1 ALARM 1 
Control devices on 
tank level negative 
feedback loop fail 














Red light indicating 
low tank level 
burned out 
1 LIGHT 1 
I 
Control valve closed too long 




Insufficient flow through 
control valve and no — / ^ \ 
detection in BIdg. 511 (Fig. 1) 
or G-2-1 
I 
Storage tank level 
feedback loop inactive 





and no detection 
in BIdg. 511 
I 
and G-2-5 
Insufficient supply of 










No detection of 
storage tank level 
in BIdg. 511 
A 
(Fig. 1) 
Close all valve signal generated 








contacts too long 
and no detection 





contacts too long 
and no detection 
in BIdg. 511 
A 
(Fig. 4) 





Control devices on storage 
tank level negative feedback 







WLT #3 transducer 









3 CARD 3 
I-V-C2 





Tank level module 
voltage high 
3 CARD 1 
l-V-CI 
Open circuit relay 
relay CR1 




3 RELAY 2 
1 
I-V-D2 
Noise on line to 
control valve 
transmitter 
3 NOISE 1 
I-V-D2 
TCW storage tank 
level receiver card 
voltage high 
3 CARD 2 
I-V-D2 
TCW storage tank 




selector switch opens 
3 SWITCH 1 
I-V-D2 
Relay coil CR7 
open circuit 





















































Current through _ A 
relay CR5-3 contacts / 5 \ 
too long and no (Fig. 2) 
detection in Bldg. 511 
I 
or G-4-1 
Current through A 
relay CR2A-1 contacts / 6 \ 
too long and no (Fig. 2) 
detection in Bldg. 511 
I 
or G-4-5 
Relay CR5 remains 





4 RELAY 1 
Relay CR2 remains 




















No operator response 
to high tank 
4HERR 1 
Tank high level 
alarm inactive 
4 ALARM 1 
Red light indicating 
high tank level 
burned out 
4 LIGHT 1 
Control devices on 
standpipe level control 
feedback loop inactive 
















No operator response 
to low standpipe level 
4HERR2 
r 
Standpipe low level 
alarm inactive 
4 ALARM 2 
Red light indicating 
low standpipe level 
burned out 










5 TRAIMSM 1 
I-P-D1 














5 RELAY 7 
Control devices on standpipe 
level control inactive or out / T \ 




Module #514 voltage 
signal high 
5 CARD 1 
I-P-B1 
Module #502 voltage 
signal hinh 




5 RELAY 1 
I-P-B1 
Farmers dig up 
transmission line 
5 DIG UP 
I-P-B1 
Power supply Auto 
mod #9109 failure off 







Pump switch module 
voltage high 














5 RELAY 4 
1 
I-P-A1 
Lead pump receiver 




Low level switch 
transfers open 
5 SWITCH 2 
l-P-Al 
Selector switch contacts 
transfer open 





5 RELAY 6 
I-P-A1 
Pump selector switch 
contacts transfer open 















5 RELAY 9 To Fig. 6 
G-6-1 
I 













PR3A-2 contacts TDPR3-1 contacts PCW #3 motor TDR3A-1 contacts 
transfer open transfer open fails to function transfer open 








Agastat relay Lag pump receiver PS-1 low level switch CR4-2 contacts 
TDR3 failure failure off transfer open transfer open 
6 RELAY 4 6RECEIV 1 6 SWITCH 1 6 RELAY 5 
I-P-A2 I-P-A2 I-P-A2 I-P-A2 
Lag switch contacts PSR-7 contacts PSR3-2 contacts PSR1-3 contacts 
transfer open transfer open transfer open transfer open 
6 SWITCH 2 6 RELAY 6 6 RELAY 7 6 RELAY 8 
I-P-A2 I-P-A2 I-P-A2 I-P-A2 
TDR1A-1 contacts PR 1A-2 contacts TDPR1-1 contacts PCW #1 motor 
transfer open transfer open transfer open fails to function 
6 RELAY 9 6 RELAY 10 6 RELAY 11 6 MOTOR 1 
I-P-A2 
I 
PCW #3 failure signal 
l 
PCW #1 failure signal 
Agastat relay generated and no generated and no 
TDR1 failure response in Bldg. 511 response in Bldg. 511 
6 RELAY 12 A A 








PCW #1 failure 
signal generated 
and no response—/§\ G-7-1 
inBldg. 511 (Fig. 6) 
and 
i 















out of relay 
tolerance PCW #1 





















7 RELAY 3 
1 1 
FR3-2 905 Hz 
Contacts QT-30 
fail to Transmitter 
close inactive 















7 ALARM 1 





PS-3 Press switch 
out of tolerance 











8 RELAY 1 
PCW #3 failure . 
signal generated _ / g \ 
and no response ip- R\ 


































PCW #3 PCW #3 
Light burned Alarm 
out failure 




Control valve is 
opened too long 
I-P-1C2 
Standpipe #2 is 
valved out 
9HERR 
Insufficient supply . 
of water from — / 4 \ 
Mocho standpipes (Fig. 2) 
and G-9-1 
I 
No detection of 
low storage-tank 
level in Bldg. 511 
A 
(Fig 1) 
G-9-2 
I 
G-1-6 
